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ABSTRACT:
This paper asks two questions connected by the fact that they both stem from
the inherent incompleteness of employment contracts: in American law, how
can the terms in employment handbooks be variable, but sometimes only
within reasonable procedurally fair circumstances; and in English law, why
doesn’t the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in employment
contracts fall foul of the strict test for implication of terms into contract? This
paper finds the answer to both questions in the doctrine of good faith. An
analysis of good faith as a “comparative conversation” between academic and
judicial debates in the US and England against the backdrop of the tension
recognized by Atiyah and Summers between the rule application and
hortatory roles of the law in a common law system leads to the conclusion
that the doctrine of good faith acts to legitimate reasonable expectations of
contracting parties. This conclusion is linked back to Karl Llewellyn’s vision
of the common law as “situation sense.” It also forms the heart of the
argument for common law reform of both English and US employment law to
recognize explicitly the coherence creating function of good faith, and is used
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to defend a rule of good faith variation against being subsumed by the at-will
presumption.

1.

Introduction
Voltaire’s Candide is famous for the many instances in which the main

character encounters situations, which initially seem to be familiar and
promising. Despite his eternal optimism, within a fairly short space of time
first appearances often deceive him and catapult him once again into more
calamities. All too easily can a comparative approach to contract law between
common law systems suffer the same fate. The language of offer, acceptance,
consideration, repudiation, implied terms and so on sound so like old friends
to the common lawyer far from home. However, this familiarity can also be
crushingly deceptive.

Nevertheless, with a little more worldliness than

Candide, and a carefully comparative approach, disasters can be avoided;
there is a wealth of interesting lines of inquiry.

4

The contract law of both England1 and the US share mutual roots2 in
the common law. Although the US began to forge its own distinctive path in
developing its own style of common law, most of the tools of contractual
analysis remained facially similar to those in England. These familiarsounding doctrines are not all false friends, however, and some straight
comparison can be possible.

3

What is particularly striking is how some of

these tools have been used in very different ways to achieve substantively
different results. This paper traces one such difference in the context of the
evolution of the employment relationship to changed circumstances.
It is best to clarify one matter before we progress any further. Much of
the discussion in the academic literature about employment market flexibility
concerns the at-will presumption.4 This paper will take a different course.
This paper will not debate the question of whether the at-will presumption is

* Harvard Law School. Many thanks to Yael Aridor Bar Ilan, Professor Christine
Jolls, Professor Duncan Kennedy, Roni Mann, Professor John Manning, Professor
Todd Rakoff, and Ramsi Woodcock for their help in discussing ideas for this paper;
however all of the errors are entirely my own.
1
For the purposes of this paper England is used to refer predominantly to the law of
England and Wales. Occasional references to the interpretation of the Scottish Law
of Session and Employment Tribunals in relation to the development of the implied
covenant of mutual trust and confidence. However, no further mention of the
Scottish law of contract will be included.
2
For example Blackstone’s commentaries were highly influential. See further Duncan
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 205 (1979)
3
Although as P.S Atiyah and Robert S. Summers note that in general “English legal
system is highly ‘formal’ and the American highly ‘substantive,’” in the area of
variation of employee handbooks that distinction is turned on its head. For a very
interesting study of English and American Law see P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers,
Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (1987) [hereinafter Atiyah & Summers,
Form and Substance].
4
This is the presumption that the employment relationship may be terminated at the
‘will” of either party to the contract without notice and without cause. See H.G.
Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant § 134, at 272 (William S. Hein &
Co. 1981) (1877).
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desirable,5 instead, the focus will be on variation within employment
relationship itself.

Although many of the issues of employee handbook

variation will concern variation of handbook terms relating to termination,
the focus of this paper will be on the contractual mechanisms surrounding
this variation, whilst the relationship is kept alive.

1.1

The common factual dilemma
The tension between the twin poles of flexibility and concrete

specificity in the contract will form another theme running through this
paper.

Both the courts and the parties are caught between the desire to

ensure certainty of the specific obligations from the moment of formation, and
to maintain sufficient flexibility in the relationship once created. This tension
is present across all areas of contract law, especially where the contract is to
last for any significant length of time, therefore it unsurprising that it is often
particularly clear in the enforcement of contracts of employment. This tension
manifests itself in incompleteness of the bargain.

5

Epstein, In Defence of Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L.R. 947; Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment-at-will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 Colum L.Rev. 11414 (1967), Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges
from Employment: a Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1979), Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: the Duty to Terminate, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1816; Janice R. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory
Guarantee, 16 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 207 (1983); William B.Gould IV, The Idea of the Job
as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework,
1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 885; Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust
Dismissal; Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev 481 (1976); Peter Stone Partee, Note,
Reversing the Presumption of Employment At Will, 44 Vand. L. Rev 689 (1991). Model
Employment Termination Act, Nationals Conference of Commissions on Uniform
State Laws (1991).
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Contracts are left deliberately incomplete for various reasons. The first
is that the transaction costs of bargaining for more precise provisions are often
6
higher than the expected benefits. Secondly, and relatedly, language will not

actually permit them to be completely exhaustive. The longer the relationship
is to last for, the more situations it must cover. It is not only costly but it is
impossible, given the inherent limits of language for an employer to specify,
ex ante, every conceivable duty and obligation of an employee and of every
benefit which will accrue.7 Also, “…as economists have long recognized,
however, [such] complete contracts are vanishingly rare. In practice,
contractual [language]…tends to be marred by gaps and flaws, forcing a
choice between intensity and extensiveness.”8
Thirdly, as Ayres and Gertner have noted, one party may sometimes
have strategic reasons for leaving a provision underspecified. Where one
party is more informed than the other, if they attempt to contract around a
certain problem, they risk alerting the less informed party to the existence of

6

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87 (1989), at 92 [hereinafter Ayres and Gertner,
Incomplete Contracts]. “These transaction costs may include legal fees, negotiation
costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability
of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a
contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these costs against the benefits of
contractually addressing a particular contingency. If either the magnitude or the
probability of a contingency is sufficiently low, a contract may be insensitive to that
contingency even if transaction costs are quite low.” See also their footnote 30; O.
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 70 (1985); MacNeil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational
Contract Law, 72 N.W.U.L. Rev. 854, 871-73 (1978); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell. J. Econ. 466, 468 (1980)
7
cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed.1994), Chapter 7; Ronald Dworkin,
Law’s Empire (1986), at 311.
8
John Donahue and Joseph Nye, Market Based Governance: Supply side, Demand
side, Upside and Downside, (2002), 9
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the problem.9 They propose that “the possibility of strategic incompleteness
leads us to suggest that efficiency-minded lawmakers should sometimes
choose penalty defaults that induce knowledgeable parties to reveal
information by contracting around the default.”10
However, in employment contracts there is a fourth reason for
incompleteness not always encountered in other types of contract. As Hugh
Collins notes, “contracts of employment illustrate a type of contract which is
incomplete by design,”11 for a reason other than expected transaction costs.
Even if every conceivable duty could be specified, both parties may not
necessarily wish to set it “in stone” ex ante. Over-specificity runs the risk of
ossifying the deal. This would run against the interests of employer and
employee; both parties often “recognize that adjustments to their obligations
have to be made to respond to changing market conditions.” 12 Flexibility is
desired by both parties. This is not a situation of informational asymmetry
alone; even if all the information which could have been known ex ante was
complete on both sides, and transaction costs were removed, neither party
would necessarily wish to set it in stone ex ante.
It is a common feature of long term contracts on both sides of the
Atlantic that they “must often be phrased in broad, flexible terms to enable
the parties to adjust their bargain to meet changed circumstances.”13 In
employment contracts, in order to mitigate this inherent tension between the
9

Ayres and Gertner, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 6 at 94.
Ayres and Gertner, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 6 at 94
11
Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (4d ed. 2003), at 331
12
Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (4d ed. 2003), at 331.
13
Ewan McKendrick, The Regulation of Long term Contracts in English Law in Good
Faith and Fault in Contract Law 305 (Beatson & Friedmann eds.,1995).
10
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need for specificity of the obligations, and the need to retain flexibility within
the bargain, employers often either retain broad contractual discretions or
14

issue employee handbooks.

These set out company rules and policies on

employee obligations, benefits, sick and pregnancy leave, dismissal process,
harassment complaint mechanisms and so forth.

1.2

Two questions
US and English law therefore face a common dilemma in how to

control variation of these employment handbooks and how to conceive of the
employment relationship more generally.

In both jurisdictions some

handbooks terms have been held to have contractual effect. However, in
order to maintain flexibility the law also regulates the degree to which such
specifying documents are subject to change. Some provision for variation of
the rules and policies contained within such handbooks must be provided for
in order to prevent the contract pinning the parties into an inefficient deal.
This paper will be concerned with two specific questions against this
background. Firstly, in England the courts’ approach is highly influenced by
the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. However, this term is stated
in such broad terms that it appears, on first glance, not to pass the test for
implication of terms into contracts used in the rest of English contract law.
Also, it appears to affect the interpretation of the other terms of the contract

14

Pauline Kim, found that in 1996 51% employees said that they had been issued
handbooks before the accepted their job offer. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will
World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997), 146.
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into which it is implied to a greater degree than traditional contract scholars
15

would expect.

The second issue relates to the treatment of employee handbooks by
some of the US states. The basis for permitting variation to these handbook
provisions is in conceptual disarray with three main approaches being
applied across different states.

Some states do not allow any variation

without additional consideration,16 some permit any variation, provided
actual notice is given17 and some permit variation, but only with reasonable
notice.

This third approach, although the most attractive intuitively,

currently lies on a very uncertain contractual doctrinal framework.
The search for a solution to these two questions will take the form of a
“comparative conversation” between the two legal systems. This will bring
together the cases, principles, academic commentary and a few statutory
provisions from both sides of the Atlantic in order to tease out these difficult
questions. A large amount of the difference can be accounted for in the
difference between the terms implied “default rules.”18

Implied terms play

such a large part in employment contracts as the parties rarely specify many
terms expressly, if at all. As Mark Freedland notes, “compared to that of
many other types of contract, the content of personal work or employment

15

See Andrew Phang, Implied Terms in English Law - Some Recent Developments [1993]
J.B.L. 242 and Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1362
per Leggatt L.J.
16
Demasse v. ITT Corp. 984 P. 2d. 1138 (1999) [hereinafter Demasse].
17
Govier v. North Sound Bank, 91 Wash. App. 493, 957 P.2d 811 (1998).
18
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, (1992)
78 Va. L.R. 821, 823-5.
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contracts is to a very large extent dependent on implied terms.”19 However,
the cases also betray a difference in the way the other formal doctrines are
applied; for example, bilateral offer and acceptance and the doctrine of
consideration is applied differently to variation of the terms of employment
across the states of the US as well as across the Atlantic. The ways these
formal and substantive doctrines interact have important consequences for
the legal presumptions used by the courts in both applying and interpreting
contracts of employment.
This paper will take the doctrine of good faith as a focus for unraveling
some of these dilemmas and argue that it has been underutlised by courts on
both sides of the Atlantic. The coherence forming function of good faith has
often been overlooked. However, in order to argue for theoretical coherence,
as well as “justice” case-by-case, it will become essential to analyze the nature
of “good faith” and its operation as a legal mechanism in common law
adjudication.

1.3

Tensions within adjudication: Atiyah and Llewellyn
Not only is there a tension inherent in the factual pattern of the

employment relationship but the courts in both the US and England also face
a common dilemma within the process of common law adjudication itself.
This tension is recognized by Patrick Atiyah as the discord between the
court’s function as an arbiter of individual disputes and its role as setting out
legal principle for the settlement of future disputes, which he terms the

19

Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (2003), at 119.
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hortatory function.20 Good faith is an abstract concept; if it is to have any
utility it must both serve a useful hortatory function and the function of
individual dispute settlement in the case at hand. It will be argued that part
of the Court’s reluctance to use this concept within the employment
relationship on both sides of the Atlantic can be traced to this tension. Courts
are either worried that it will be too hortatory and infect other doctrines with
its overbreadth, or are skeptical of its ability to determine concrete cases.
Some of the predominant commentators on good faith have criticized the
founding father of the Uniform Commercial Code, for misunderstanding the
project of conceptualization, for incorporating concept of good faith,21 which
22
was insufficiently coherent. However, it will be argued that Karl Llewellyn’s

methodology of deciding cases by situation sense has greater appeal than
many have given it.23 “Situation sense” is the method of dispute resolution

20

P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987) especially at 125
[hereinafter Pragmatism and Theory]; P.S Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism:
Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 Iowa L Rev 1202 (1980),
[hereinafter Atiyah, Principles to Pragmatism]. Also in M.A. Eisenberg, the Nature of
the Common Law (1988) pp4-7 it is noted that the courts have two businesses, that of
deciding individual disputes, and of enriching our body of legal norms. See also
Elizabeth Peden, Policy Concerns Behind Implication of Terms in Law, 30 L.Q.R. 459
(2001). Peden noticed that the strictness of the necessity test can lead to seeming
incoherence; “when the courts focus too intensely on whether a term is “necessary,”
rather than relying on broad principles, the results can be unfortunate.”
21
UCC § 1-203
22
Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – its Recognition and
Conceptualisation 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 825 (1982).
23
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on Theory of Appellate Decisions, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395,
(1950) 398. A notable use of “Situation Sense” praised and utilized constructively is
in Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of ‘Default Rules’ and ‘Situation
Sense,’ in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Jack Beatson and David Friedmann
eds., 1995) [herienafter Rakoff, Situation Sense]
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put forward by Llewellyn in his later work, of reasoning by “type facts in
24
their context.” He saw this as best captured by Levin Goldschmidt:

“every fact pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in, carried
within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law.

This is a natural law

which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rest on the
solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of man and of the life
conditions of the time and place.”25

However, as Todd Rakoff has convincingly argued, this passage can make
situation sense sound rather too “mystical.”26 In fact Llewellyn’s methodology
does not fall into being mere intuitionism; it is “meant to be both a practical
27

and creative human activity, and not mere divination.”

This methodology captures much of the essence of the dispute
settlement function of judges. In a system operating the situation sense
method the judge is applying the type fact specific application of the rule.
This explains why good faith can be described by Summers as excluding
multifarious different facets of “bad faith” conduct.28 Use of a situation sense
method does not preclude the judge from recognizing general unifying
principles. It should be remembered that finding the appropriate solution to
24

Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960), at 60.
and 121-154 [hereinafter Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition].
25
Leon Goldschmidt, Preface to Kritik des Entwurfs eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, Krit.
Zeitschr. F.d.ges. Rechtswissenschaft, Vol 4, No. 4. Cited in supra Karl N. Llewellyn,
The Common Law Tradition, note 24 at 122
26
supra Rakoff, Situation Sense note 23, at 202.
27
Rakoff, Situation Sense, supra note 23at 203
28
Robert R. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va.L.Rev. 195, 201 (1968)
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“type facts in their context”29 is itself an important principle. It is important
for the central thesis that Llewellyn’s methodology does not preclude the
possibility of principles of substantive law aiding in the process, of a situation
30

sense judgment.

The tension between general hortatory function and tightness to the
individual dispute is clearly visible in English law in relation to the implied
term of mutual trust and confidence. The courts purport to be constrained by
a strict test which permits the implication of terms only in very narrowly
defined circumstances, which pushes the courts away from the more general
into a term tailored as closely as possible to the fact pattern of the case. This
deliberately down-plays any hortatory effect of an implication. The reason
behind this is always cited as being the fiction that courts role is only as in
filling small gaps in contracts, rather than dealing more generally at the level
of default standards.

In employment contracts, which are naturally

incomplete, this is a fiction.
An implication of a good faith term, therefore poses large problems for
the way English courts view their own role. Until they are comfortable with
their hortatory role they will not be comfortable with the concept of
principles. However, there is a paradox: by playing down their hortatory
role, the English courts are forced into considerations of policy to decide
individual cases. General assertions of the parties which go beyond the fact
pattern of the case are tested against a general “floodgates” argument of
“public policy.” This conception of “public policy” is often ill informed and
29
30

Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, supra note 24.
This is noted by P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, at 89-143
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undertheorised.31 This paper will argue for an approach which appeals to
good faith as a principle, and not just as a policy.
One of the problems faced by courts in both the US and the UK is that
broad hortatory principles often conflict. Recognition of conflict at the level of
32
principle is not new within contract law, however it is one which is in need

of careful treatment when a solution is proposed in practice. In US law there
is a potential for conflict between the hortatory effect of good faith and the
hortatory effect of the at-will presumption.

However in this particular

situation, this can be resolved without necessarily requiring the demise of the
at-will rule by separating out the content of the individual dispute settlement
norm from the hortatory function of the principle.

Specific applications of

the good faith, or at will principles, can be used on the lowest level of
abstraction as rules, without annihilating either principle.

The hortatory

function of the at-will presumption will be reduced by the recognition of the
good faith principle in variation, where previously it had affected the rhetoric
of the more pro-variation cases and dissents.33 Although issues concerning
variation and termination may, in some senses be similar, they are
importantly different. The requirements of good faith have a stronger claim
on the regulation of variation of the contract than termination as the
31

See further section 4.1.2.
Particularly in the US, for example, it is a common theme within the work of the
American Legal Realists and Critical Legal Studies Movement. See further: F. Cohen,
The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 Yale L.J. 201 (1931); F. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Clare
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale, L.J. 997 (1985);
Ronald Dworkin recognizes that conflict of principles is also a problem which his
hypothetical ideal judge, Hercules, must contend with, Law’s Empire, (1986), 177.
33
E.g. the dissent of Jones V.C.J. in Demasse, supra note 16.
32
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relationship is purported to be continuing. This separation of variation and
termination can be supported by arguments from autonomy and efficiency.
Therefore, bearing all of these tensions in mind, we will start with an
analysis framed from situation sense. First of all the “handbook variation”
situation will be considered from the US approach, and then from the English
approach. The English approach will introduce the broader issues of the
conceptualization of the relationship between the parties. This will set the
scene for the comparative conversation and analysis of the potential role of
good faith. Once the role of good faith has been introduced the paper will
consider the ramifications for this at the level of principle and rule application
on the at-will presumption.
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2.

Variation of handbooks: the US approaches
Handbooks provide a crucial mechanism for employers to specify

employee obligations, policies and benefits.

Historically the US state courts

have been hesitant to accept any contractual effect of employee handbooks,
for example in Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co. the Kansas Supreme Court
held that a handbook was “only an expression of company policy and
procedures. Its terms were not bargained for by the parties and any benefits
conferred by it were mere gratuities.”34 However from the early 1980s the
courts showed increased willingness to consider the effects of handbooks in
contract or promissory estoppel.35 This paper will not attempt to set out the
development of the employee handbook jurisprudence as this is set out
36
admirably in articles by Kohn and by Pratt, but instead to sketch out by way

of case example three of the predominant modern approaches. This will be
followed by a consideration of the policy arguments surrounding the area.
The states are divided over the contractual basis for enforcement of
terms within employee handbooks. Some states consider the handbook to

34

551 P.2d 779, 782 (Kansas 1976). See further Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience:
Preventing Employers from Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks,
24 Cardozo L.Rev. 799, 812 (2003)
35
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)
(legitimate expectations analysis); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622,
(Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257 (New Jersey 1985)
(unilateral contract analysis), Hammond v. N.D. State Pers. Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359, 361
(N.D. 1984) (promissory estoppel).
36
Kohn;, supra note 34; Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of
Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 139
U. Pa. L. Rev. 197 (1990). See also Stephen Carey Sullivan, Comment, Unilateral
Modification of Employee Handbooks: A Contractual Analysis, 5 Regent U. L. Rev. 261
(1995)
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constitute a unilateral contract, whereas others treat it as an independent
bilateral contract. This has large implications for whether the courts consider
consideration to be necessary for variation.

2.1

37

No consideration required: Govier v. North Sound Bank

Ms. Govier, on the first day of her employment was given a copy of the
personnel handbook. Although she had not been told at the time that her
employment was for any specific length of time, the handbook provided that
“a probationary period lasting the first ninety days of your new job applies to
all new employees….If you reach the end of this probationary period
successfully, you will have your fist formal performance appraisal interview
with your supervisor prior to the end of your first ninety days, and you will
be considered a permanent employee, assuming continued satisfactory performance
(italics added).” It additionally provided that once the probationary period
was over “you would not be dismissed for poor performance without first being
counseled…and given an opportunity to improve your performance.”
During Govier’s employment, the bank varied the handbook
unilaterally at least eight times. The distribution of a memo to all employees
was deemed to be the moment of modification.
In 1993 the Bank’s presented new agreements to Govier and her loan
originator colleagues and told them that they must sign the contracts by 17

th

December or be terminated. The new terms were less favorable in that they

37

91 Wash. App. 493, 957 P.2d 811 (1998) [hereinafter Govier]
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eliminated sick leave, holiday and vacation pay and allowed either party to
terminate on 20 days notice.
Seinfeld J for the court held that “an employer may unilaterally amend
or revoke policies and procedures established in an employee handbook”
38

regardless of whether this power is reserved expressly.”

The court held that

bilateral contract analysis was not appropriate as the bank had, without her
consent, varied the handbook at least eight times. Seinfeld J held that “the law
should not tie employers to anachronistic policies in perpetuity merely
because they failed to expressly reserve at the outset the right to make policy
changes.”39 The court held that the only requirement was that the employer
must notify the employee of the change.
This approach has drastic results for Ms. Govier as, by refusing to
accept the new terms, she is caught ‘between a rock and a hard place.’ She
can neither rely on her previous contractual terms, as they had been validly
unilaterally varied, nor may she rely on the new terms as she had refused to
sign the new agreements.40 In effect, her contract therefore practically
“evaporates.”

2.2

Consideration is required: Demasse v. ITT Corp.41

38

Id. at 816
Id. at 816
40
Govier, supra note 37, at 817
41
supra note 16. Arizona law applied by the US Court of appeals for the 9th circuit on
diversity jurisdiction. Similar cases in other jurisdictions include Torosayan v.
Boehringer Ingleheim Pharm. (1995) 234 Conn. 1, 662 A.2d 89; Brodie v. General
Chemical Corp (Wyo, 1997) 934 P.2d 1263, 1268; Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley
Community Services (7th Cir 1994) 19 F.3d 359, 364)
39
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This case involved a change to the mechanism of deciding which
employees would be dismissed in the situation of a need for collective
redundancy. The employment handbooks originally provided that layoffs
would be carried out in reverse order of seniority (commonly referred to as
“last in, first out,” or “LIFO” in English cases). It expressly provided that
“ITT Cannon reserves the right to amend, modify or cancel this handbook as
well as any or all of the various policies, rules, procedures and programs
outlined in it.” In 1993 ITT changed its layoff guidelines such that layoffs
would not be performed under LIFO, but on each employee’s “abilities and
42

documentation of performance.”

All of the plaintiffs were laid off before less

senior employees and attempted to rely on their pre 1989 contract provisions.
Feldman J held, under Arizona law, that “when employment
circumstances offer a term of job security to an employee who might
otherwise be dischargeable at will and the employee acts in response to that
promise, the employment relationship is no longer at will but is instead
governed by the terms of the contract.”43 In a unilateral contract, once the
offer is accepted by performance, the terms cannot be changed.

The court

held that as there is no difference in law between express and implied
contracts, an implied contract cannot be varied without offer, acceptance and
44
consideration” .

Crucially, in addition, the court added that “continued

42

Demasse, supra note 16, para. 7.
Id. para. 14. The court considers that a handbook is typically made up from
promissory and non promissory terms. See Sodelun v. Public Service co 944 P.2d616,
621 (Colo.App.1997). The court cites Pratt, supra note 34.
44
Demasse, supra note 16, para. 19
43
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employment after issuance of a new handbook does not constitute
acceptance.”

45

In defiant strain Feldman J took the opposite policy approach to that
taken in Govier. He recognized that “if a contractual job security provision
can be eliminated by unilateral modification, an employer can essentially
terminate the employee at any time, thus abrogating any protection provided
the employee. For example, an employer could terminate an employee who
has a job security provision simply by saying, “I revoke that term and, as of
today, you’re dismissed.”46
Jones, VCJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that it
was necessary, as a matter of employment law, that “once an employer takes
action, for whatever reasons, an employee must either accept those changes,
quit, or be discharged. Because the employer retains this control over the
employment relationship, unilateral acts of the employer are binding on its
employees and both parties should understand this rule.”47
In reply to Justice Jones’ dissent, the court argued, “to those who
believe our conclusion will destroy an employer’s ability to update and
modernize its handbook, we can only reply that the great majority of
handbook

terms

are

certainly

non-contractual

and

can

be

revised…permission to modify can always be obtained by mutual agreement
and for consideration.”

45

Id. para. 23, citing 1 s. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 91 (W. Jaeger
3d ed. 1957)
46
Demasse, supra note 16, para. 28.
47
Id. para 58
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2.3

Unilateral variation with reasonable notice: Asmus v. Pacific Bell

48

The benefit at issue in Asmus was a “Management Employment Security
Policy” (MESP), which Pacific Bell had previously offered management level
employees. This provided that, “it will be Pacific Bell’s policy to offer all
management employees who continue to meet our changing business
expectations employment security through reassignment to and retraining for
other management positions, even if their present jobs are eliminated. This
policy will be maintained so long as there is no change that will materially
affect Pacific Bell’s business plan achievement.” In 1990 Pacific Bell notified
its employees that it might need to discontinue the MESP “given the reality of
the marketplace, changing demographics of the workforce and the continued
need for cost reduction.” In October 1991 Pacific Bell notified its employees
that it would discontinue the policy as of 1st April 1992.
The court held that for unilateral contract that “once the promissor
determines after a reasonable time that it will terminate or modify the
contract, and provides employees with reasonable notice of the change,
additional consideration is not required.” Approving Justice Jones’ dissent in
Demasse they held that “the mutuality of obligation principle requiring new
consideration for contract termination applied to bilateral contracts only.”
They also held that a rule holding that continued performance of employment
did constitute consideration and to hold other wise “would contradict the
general principle that the law will not concern itself with the adequacy of
consideration.”

48

96 Cal.Rptr 2d 179
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George CJ dissented, arguing that the majority had misinterpreted
ordinary contract law, as had the majority in Demasse. He also argued that the
economic incentives of the majority’s holding “condones and encouraged
manipulative, oppressive and unfair treatment of employees” as it permits an
employer to rescind a promise “simply because the promise later becomes
inconvenient or financially disadavantageous to the employer during an
economic downturn, a time when the employee would most expect to be able
49

to rely upon and benefit from the employer’s promise.”

Such contractual

promises, he asserts, if they could be altered so easily “would only be as good
as the employer’s desire to keep the promise at some unspecified point in the
future.” He sees the key as being the employer’s ability to contract out of the
obligation ex ante with regard to new employees.
Although George CJ in Asmus argues that, if the employer is concerned
about flexibility of handbooks, she should expressly forbear from incurring
obligations in the first place, this is not necessarily desirable for either party.
As discussed in the first chapter, there is always a tension between the needs
of specificity and flexibility; to dismiss this tension in this offhand manner is
not likely to lead to coherence.

The law should not be encouraging

employers not to provide any degree of specificity at all. Specificity is not
only useful for the employer, but the employee too, as they gain notice of
their rights and obligations.

2.3.1

49

Substantive fairness and good faith – a slightly different approach

Id., at 20.
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It is arguable that the approach in Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co.,

50

is a different

approach from that adopted in Asmus.51 Twelve years before the Supreme
Court of Michigan had held in Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield52 that an
employee may “legitimately expect” that his employer will uniformly apply
personnel policies “in force at any time.” However, in Bankey the Supreme
Court of Michigan reduced the scope of this ruling by holding that an
employer may amend the handbook “from time to time” even if no discretion
to amend was included within the handbook. The Court nevertheless
cautioned, “against an assumption that our answer would condone changes
made in bad faith.” Poetically, the Court argued that “fairness suggests that a
discharge-for-cause policy announced with flourishes and fanfare at noonday
should not be revoked by a pennywhistle trill at midnight” therefore
reasonable notice must be required.
Brian Kohn and Jason Walters consider this to be a different approach
altogether.53

Kohn sees the court as having “eschewed the contractual

analysis altogether.” This is a very strong reading of Bankey. Griffen J did not
entirely dispense with contractual analysis before delving in to the policies to
be weighed. After an exhaustive analysis of the case law, he held, instead that
“the principles on which Toussaint is based would be undermined if an
employer could benefit from the good will generated by a discharge-for –

50

432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Mich. 1989) [hereinafter Bankey].
See Kohn, supra note 34.
52
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., supra note 35
53
Kohn, supra note 34. Jason A. Walters, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down:
Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32
Cumb. L. Rev. 375.
51
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cause policy while unfairly manipulating the way in which it is revoked.”54
Although traditional contract analysis des not reach a decisive result in this
case, this does not necessarily mean that the courts’ reasoning was set loose
ungrounded into the realm of policy balancing. This is not a decision made
55
entirely on “policy” but from an important “hortatory principle.” Griffen J

also cautioned “against an assumption that our answer would condone
changes made in bad faith.”56 The use of the language of “bad faith” intimates
that the true rationale behind Toussaint appeals to the principle of good faith.
As will be argued further below, arguments from principle appeal to a more
persuasive level of coherence and depth than mere assertions of “policy.”57

2.3.2

What is reasonable notice?
Before the comparison may continue to analysis of the basis for this

requirement it is necessary to take a short side step and consider briefly what
is regarded as reasonable notice in the states which have adopted and
recognize this condition. For example in Asmus, the two year period from
1990 was held to be “ample.” In Al- Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,58 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applying Washington law held that posting
change to arbitration policy in stores and in applicant packets did not

54

Bankey, supra note 50, at 457
For this distinction in more detail see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(1978) Ch. 4. Although Dworkin is, himself inconsistent with the terminology, the
distinction is important as principles appeal to coherence at a system wide level,
whereas “public policy” is an often pejorative term for unsophisticated balancing of
individuals interests in a case.
56
Bankey supra note 50, at 456
57
At section 4.2.1.
58
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 747
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constitute reasonable notice to former employees. However in Mannix v.
59
County of Monroe, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying

Michigan law, held that “Distribution of a new employee handbook
constitutes reasonable notice, regardless of whether the affected employee
60
actually reads it. In Highstone v. Westin Engineering, the Court of Appeal for

the Sixth Circuit applying Michigan law held that publishing the handbook
online and sending 2 emails one month in advance, were sufficient to show
reasonable notice. The method used to distribute amendment, they held,
must be uniform and reasonable.61 Therefore we can see that, although the
case law is not entirely consistent the court tends to look to whether the
employer went through reasonable efforts to notify the employees; the
standard appears to be constructive, rather than actual, notice.

2.4

Policy arguments
The following chapters will advocate an approach which takes the

same policy direction as Asmus, Bankey and some of the sentiments from
Demasse. This is for five reasons.
Firstly, the Govier rule is in neither the interests of the employee nor the
employer. The tension between flexibility and certainty, mentioned in the
previous chapter, does not map on exactly to the interests of the employer as
opposed to the interests of the employee. This tension plays itself out within
the interests of both of the parties to the contract. It is too simple to say that
59

348 F.3d 526 (2003)
187 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1999),
61
Grow v. General Products Inc., 184 Mich. App. 379, 457 N.W.2d 167 (1990), appeal
denied, 439 Mich. 871, 478 N.W.2d 92 (1991).
60
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the employer has an interest in maintaining her own flexibility as complete
flexibility for the employer may be harmful to her employer’s interests. For
example, Slawson argues62 that a rule which allows the employer to vary its
express promises without notice “deprives employers of a valuable
bargaining chip with their employees, and of a valuable means of attracting
and keeping desirable employees, and of increasing its employees’ job
satisfaction and loyalty.” This is because a well-informed employee knows
that any promise will be revoked.
Secondly, as the employee will have no incentive to bargain for such an
unenforceable promise, this will have the effect of mandating at-will
employment, as any promises of job security will be, themselves, revocable atwill. This is an inefficient outcome, as those employees who would value
these extra safeguards will be practically precluded from securing them.63
In addition, “the employer’s inability to make enforceable promises of
employment security will also put both employees who do not want to join
unions and their employers who do not want them to join at an unfair
disadvantage. . . . Union organizers in the states where the courts [permit
unilateral modification] can now tell employees that no matter what their
employers may promise them, the only way they can obtain rights—rather
than just unenforceable promises—of employment security is to join a union.”

62

W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict
with Public Policy? 10 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 9, 30-31 (2003).
63
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (2d ed 1997) ch4. Easterbrook
& Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law; the Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 1416 (1989); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 81 (3d ed. 1986), cited in Ayres
and Gertner, supra note 6, at 91.
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As Professor Hugh Collins has noted, “although the willingness to adapt is an
essential ingredient in a co-operative and productive working relation…a fear
that this discretionary power will be operated unfairly by an employer is
likely to subvert the cooperation.”64
Fourthly, as noted above, neither the employer nor the employee is
well served by a complete lack of specificity in the terms. As was noted in the
discussion of George CJ’s dissent in Asmus, some degree of specificity is in the
interests of the employer, as this helps them to direct the employees.65
Employees are also benefited by increased specificity as this allows them to be
more certain what duties they owe and what benefits they can expect in
return. In the United Kingdom, the obligation to provide a written statement
of particulars of employment,66 is considered to be one of the first modern
employment rights to have been enacted.

67

Fifthly, the situation of handbook variation will always have an
inherent asymmetry, as the variation will be solely at the instigation of the
employer. The employer knows what the new variation will be in advance of
its effect, but if the variation is deemed to take effect immediately, the
employee does not. Professors Ayres and Gertner have proposed a theory of
how to decide when default rules in contract should be penalty defaults.
Penalty defaults are used to remedy certain informational asymmetries
inherent in a relationship. A rule, which provided for reasonable notice,

64

Hugh Collins, Employment Law (2003), at 106.
Discussed at section 2.3.
66
First enacted in the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 (now repealed); now
contained within Employment Rights Act 1996 s. 1
67
Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris, Labour Law (3d ed 2001), at 249.
65

28

would not be a traditional type of penalty default, as information is not
elicited when the stronger party contracts round it, but later in the contract
performance itself. In this situation, the penalty is in the information about
the content of the new terms the employer must provide the employees with
in reasonable time for a lawful variation to take place. This added time to
consider the new terms will allow the employees opportunity to decide
whether to remain in this employment or seek other opportunities elsewhere.
Such a penalty default rule could avoid another informational
asymmetry in the case of variation of handbooks within a contract which is
already at-will (although this situation was not covered on the facts of the
cases cited above). In this situation an employer can terminate the
employment without notice at any time. This paper will argue that such
contracts should not be simply variable at-will in the same way as they are
terminable. In altering the terms of employment in an at-will contract, the
employer is, in effect, terminating the relationship. It is possible that this
might not be self evident to an employee, who is still receiving instructions
from the employer. A terminated employee considering re-engagement on
different terms, if unaware of the nature of at-will employment, may consider
themselves to be under less control and with “less to lose” than the employee
who is purportedly retained, but under different conditions.
The question of employee expectations in this situation is clearly an
empirical one. An employee may or may not have more expectations of what
they are due under the contract, depending on how aware they are of the
background default rules. Some employees, it seems have a large degree of
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faith in legal default rules, over explicit statements in contracts. For example,
Pauline Kim has conducted an empirical study into employee expectations
relating to dismissal. She found that even where a handbook provided that
the “Company reserves the right to discharge employees at any time, for any
reason, with or without cause” 62.6% of employees nevertheless believed that
discharge without cause is unlawful.68 A similar method to the one used by
Professor Kim could be used to test the hypothesis that at-will employees
consider variation in their employment terms as different to their termination.
If employees have such a degree of faith in legal default rules to protect them
from the employer terminating them at-will, it would be interesting to
discover whether there was also a high level of ignorance of the employee’s
right to unilaterally walk away from the contract at any time. If a significant
degree of ignorance would be found a penalty default requiring reasonable
notice of variation, could ensure that this informational asymmetry would be
corrected.

2.5

Summary of the US arguments

The different states seem to be in conceptual confusion over the appropriate
policy and legal basis for handbook variation, oscillating between requiring
no notice and conceptualizing the relation as unilateral, and between
requiring consideration or reasonable notice and considering the relation to
be bilateral. None of the approaches described are without their various
68

Pauline T. Kim, supra note 14, A study of unemployment claimants was carried out
during August, September and October of 1996 in St Louis City and County,
Missouri. Claimants with different levels of education, between no high school
diploma and graduate degree were assessed.
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problems. Unilateral or bilateral analysis here is used little more than as a
label for the policy approach recognized by the courts. In this confusion it is
unsurprising that the Courts in Bankey and Asmus, plumped for an “in
between approach.” The strands assembled in this Chapter will be reanalyzed
and a proposal for coherence suggested as part of the comparative
conversation of Chapter 4.

However, before this is possible, the English

position must be first put on the table.
3.

Handbooks in England
The existence of an employment handbook is not sufficient to give it

contractual effect. English Law requires an employer to give every employee
on employment a written statement of particulars of employment under
section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. English law treats the important
issue is instead one of whether it is incorporated into the employment
contract itself. As in most states in the US, as far as a handbook contains a
codification of policy instructions to employees, these do not have contractual
effect and are the subject of managerial prerogative, and therefore may be
varied unilaterally without notice.69

3.1

The question of incorporation
The main practitioners guide, Harvey on Industrial Relations and

Employment Law states that the test for whether handbook terms are
incorporated into the contract of employment is “whether it is reasonably to
be inferred from the circumstances that the parties must have intended them
69

Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No 2) [1972] 2 Q.B. 455, Simon Deakin
& Gillian Morris, Labour Law (3d 2001), at 268.
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to have contractual force.”70 For example in Petrie v. Mac Fisheries Ltd71 the
court held that displaying a notice about sick pay entitlements on the factory
noticeboard was insufficient.
The terms must also be suitable for incorporation in to the contract.
The courts and Employment Tribunals divide terms in a handbook between
terms and policies. Policies tend to be treated as mere instances of managerial
prerogative.

Policies must nevertheless be “introduced for a legitimate

purpose” and must be consistent with the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence discussed below.

72

The test for whether provisions in a handbook are incorporated is
always a difficult matter of construction, for which the Courts and
Employment tribunals use a variety of tests. In Quinn v. Calder Industrial
73
Materials Ltd Browne-Wilkinson J held that regard should be had to whether

the document has been drawn to the attention of employees by the employer
or whether it has been followed without exception for a substantial period.
Another option open to the court is to imply into the contract of
employment under the “officious bystander test,” for implication of terms,
although this approach is not often used for handbook terms and works rules.
The “officious bystander” test was first set out in 1926 in the Court of
Appeal’s judgment in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries.
70

Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employmnet Law (last updated February 2005)
at [371-375], [hereinafter Harvey].
71
[1940] 1 K.B. 258
72
e.g. in Dryden v. Greater Glasgow Health Board [1992] I.R.L.R. 469 (EAT),
introducing a no smoking policy. See also Wandsworth Borough Council v. D’Silva
[1998] I.R.L.R. 193 (CA); Grant v. South West Trains Ltd [1998] I.R.L.R. 188 (QBD) –
broadly stated equal opportunities policy did not have contractual effect.
73
[1996] I.R.L.R. 126
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“Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be
expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying, so that if, while
the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest
some express provision for it in their agreement they would testily suppress
him with a common ‘oh, of course.’”74
The English cases on variation of handbook terms often involve
situations where the handbook has been collectively bargained by a union.
The general rule is that an employer cannot alter the contract by unilateral
denunciation of the collective agreement where the relevant terms have
become part of the contract of employment.75 Likewise, the employee cannot
unilaterally resile from the terms by mere disagreement with the union,

76

although two cases suggest that, if the employee leaves the union
membership, they may cease to be bound by the collectively bargained
terms.77

3.2

The operation of the handbook provisions: background norms

The role of handbooks in the English cases are always analysed in the light of
the employment relationship as a whole, rather than as extraneous contracts.

74

Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 K.B. 206 per McKinnon L.J. The
term must also be sufficiently precise, Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage co Ltd
[1957] A.C. 555 per Viscount Simonds. The cry of “oh, of course,” must come from
both parties and not just one of them: Deeley v. British Rail Engineering Ltd [1980]
I.R.L.R. 147.
75
Cadoux v. Central Regional Council and National Coal board v. National Union of
Mineworkers, [1986] I.C.R. 736. See also Harvey at A[336].
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Tocher v. General Motors Scotland, Ltd [1981] I.R.L.R. 55 (EAT)
77
Singh v. British Steel Corporation [1974] I.R.L.R. 131; Land v. West Yorkshire
Metropolitan County Council [1981] I.C.R. 334 (CA), although the editors of Harvey
consider these cases to be incorrectly decided and that the approach of Tocher is to
be preferred (at A[339]).
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They must therefore be read in light of the rest of the doctrinal considerations
of the contractual relation. In England, courts are unlikely to hold that the
provisions of the handbook are exhaustive of either party’s obligations under
the contract.
78
In Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No 2) the employees of

British Rail, in protest, instigated a policy of “work to rule” under union
direction in which they performed only the duties specified in the
employment handbook to the bare minimum the wording would allow. The
Court of Appeal for a variety of reasons held unanimously that employees
who had initiated a “work to rule” were in breach of their employment
contracts.

The reasoning of the three judges in the Court of Appeal is

particularly interesting as they all have different conceptions of the scope and
nature of the contract of employment.
Lord Denning M.R. argued that the work rules did not constitute terms
in the employment contract. Nevertheless, he held that there is “clearly a
breach of contract first to construe the rules unreasonably, and then to put
that unreasonable construction into practice.”79 The lack of a good faith
motive rendered the employees in breach.80 Roskill L.J, disagreed with Lord
Denning’s use of subjective motivation in construing the contract and held
that “questions of intent are usually irrelevant in determining whether or not
there has been a breach of contract.”81 He held instead that employees may

78

Supra note 69
Id. at 490E-F
80
Id. at 492
81
Id. at 506
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not rely on an interpretation of the rule which is “wholly unreasonsble.”82 As
an alternative ground he found that there was an implied term that the
employee would not seek to interpret the rules such as to disrupt the railway
83
system; he appears to have used the test of an officious bystander, for terms

implied in fact rather than in law. Thirdly, Buckley L.J. held that there was an
implied term “that within the term of the contract the employee must serve
the employer faithfully with a view to promoting those commercial interests
for which he is employed.” 84Buckley L.J.’s interpretation, which imports the
strongest background norm into the contract, is the one which has been
generally followed by the courts.85 As we will see in the next section, the
openness of the courts to recognizing that the express terms of the
employment contract rest on a large residue of legal defaults and principles
has been a major factor in the development of the implied term of mutual
trust and confidence.

3.3

Variation of incorporated terms
In the context of a favorable variation of the employee handbook the

courts have held that the employees continuation of work is sufficient
consideration for the variation “thereby abandoning any argument that the
increase should have been even greater, and removing a potential area of
dispute between the employer and employee. The employer has both secured

82

Id. at 507G
Id. at 508H
84
Id. at 498G
85
See Ticehurst v. British Telecommunications Plc [1992] I.R.L.R. 219; Cresswell v.
Board of Inland Revenue [1984] I.R.L.R. 190.
83
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a benefit and avoided a detriment.”86 Attempts to challenge only variation of
policies “have not met with great success.”87
Attempts to diminish rights under an employee’s contract are dealt
with under the “portmanteau” implied term of mutual trust and confidence.88
English law recognizes a number of terms implied by law into the
employment relationship.89

However, the most important of these is the

implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
The Honourable Mr Justice Lindsay, a former President of the
Employment Appeal Tribunal, writing extra judicially,90 notes that one of the
first recognizable formulations of the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence was seen in Courtaulds Northern Textiles v. Andrew.91 In this case
Arnold J approved a formulation of the term proposed by the claimant’s
lawyers,
86

Lee v. GEC Plessy Telecommunications [1993] I.R.L.R. 383 (QBD)
Harvey supra note 70 at [376] See Dryden v. Greater Glasgow Health Board [1992]
I.R.L.R. 469 (EAT), Wandswoth London Borough Council v. d’Silva [1998] I.R.L.R.
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L. Brief. 1998, 5(9), 107-108.
88
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Byrne, [1977] I.R.L.R. 29. See further Douglas Brodie, Beyond Exchange, the New
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“that the employers would not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct
themselves in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the
relationship of confidence and trust between the parties.”92
In Woods v. W.M Car Ltd93 Browne-Wilkinson J in the EAT approved
Courtaulds.

He added, “we regard this implied term as one of great

importance in good industrial relations.”94
Briefly to sum up before we go on, the key in the English cases is
whether the term in the handbook is incorportated. D’Silva provides that this
will be so if the provision, properly so regarded, confers a rights on
employees rather than doing no more than setting out guidelines as to what is
expected or required. Interpretation of a right conferring provision will be
subject to interpretation in the light of the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence and will require consideration to flow for variation.

3.4

Other uses of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence

This term implied at law is not just important for the specific duties it imparts,
but has also been influential in the way in which contracts of employment are
interpreted. For example in United Bank v. Akhtar95 the EAT were confronted
with a term providing that, “the Bank may from time to time require an
employee to be transferred temporarily or permanently to any place of
business which the Bank may have in the UK for which a relocation or other
allowance may be payable at the discretion of the Bank.” Using the implied
92

At para 10. Courtaulds, supra note 91.
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term of mutual trust and confidence, they held that this could only be
lawfully exercised if reasonable notice were given and if the discretion as to
allowances was exercised reasonably.
The question of the strength of the implied obligation of trust and
confidence was directly considered in Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Area Health
Authority.

96

Although Stuart Smith L.J. held that the implied term of mutual

trust and confidence superceded the express wording of the contract, the
other two members of the Court of Appeal held otherwise. Leggatt L.J. held,
formalistically, that the implied term cannot have any effect over the express
terms of the contract.
Browne-Wilkinson V-C’s solution is the more elegant. He held that
where the express term includes a contractual discretion this must be read as
being bounded by the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
Although traditional contract scholars consider this to be unconventional,97 it
is far from so. This is precisely the approach that the courts take to the
interpretation of many statutes, presuming them not to violate rule of law
principles unless clear wording is used.98 As we will consider below,99 given
the openness of text, the impossibility of an uncontroversial reading purely
from the language, and the speculativity of deriving true legislative intent, a
96

[1992] Q.B. 333
this suggestion was criticized by Legatt LJ and subsequently by Phang supra note
15.
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For an example of this principle in action see Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign
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Sexual History) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 A.C. 45. See also the discussion of these
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presumptive approach is all the court is left with.100 What commentators, such
as Phang, and Legatt L.J. miss, is that court’s adjudication of contracts
involves far more than following the intention of the parties. By entering even
into presumed intention, they are going beyond the simple autonomous will
of the two parties. This will be considered in greater detail in the next Chapter
against the backdrop of the US case of Tymshare v. Covell and the English case
101

of Mallone v. BPP Industries.

3.5

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977

In addition, it is worth noting, in a brief detour, that express terms may be
avoided under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Under section 3, a party is
prevented from unreasonably excluding or restricting liability for rendering
substantially different, or no performance. Under the test in Brigden, a court
will make a distinction between exclusion clauses, to which the test of
reasonableness will then be applied, and provisions “setting out the
entitlement and limits of his rights.” 102

3.6

Summary of the English position

The English approach is therefore very different to that of the majority of the
US states. The relationship is considered as distinctly bilateral. This does not,
100

See for example, Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev 863 (1930),;
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), 313-354, David L. Shapiro, Continuity and
Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y. U. l. Rev. 921 (1992) accepts this
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Courtroom, 50 U. Chi, L. Rev 800 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
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however, conclude the analysis. Given the dominant effect of the implied
term of mutual trust and confidence on the contract of employment itself the
most important two questions in the English cases have become: firstly,
whether the particular term or condition has been “incorporated” into the
contract of employment; and secondly what the effect of the implied term of
mutual trust and confidence will have on the recognition and flexibility of
that term with regard to all of the others in the relationship as a whole.

4. Cross fertilization: the comparative conversation
There are several unexplained issues on both sides of the Atlantic. One is the
search for the doctrinal source of the obligation of reasonable notice from
Asmus. Another relates to the English implied term of mutual trust and
confidence and how such a broad obligation can satisfy the, usually stringent,
test for implying terms into contracts. The analysis in this chapter will aim to
demonstrate that tools for answering both of these dilemmas can be derived
from the opposite side of the ocean.

As Atiyah and Summers, writing

together, note, the English and American systems do have important
methodological differences in legal reasoning. This means that any proposal
for a “legal transplant” must be treated carefully and sensitively.103 However,
with appropriate sensitivity and care to these factors there are interesting
lessons to be learned from both systems, which can bring clarity to these two
confused issues.
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4.1 How can the implied term of mutual trust and confidence have survived
the test for implication of terms into the contract?
In English Law terms may be implied into contracts in three ways: by
104

statute;

by custom;105 and by operation of law. Terms implied at common

law fall into two categories, those “implied in fact” and those “implied in
law.” We have already considered the officious bystander test of McKinnon
L.J. in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries, when considering incorporation of
handbooks into the contract of employment.106 Another formulation of the
test is that implication must be “necessary to give the transaction such
business efficacy as the parties must have intended.”107 If the contract can be
operative without it, it is not implied into the bargain. Terms implied in law
may be implied into contracts of a certain type. The test for implication
clearly cannot be the business efficacy/officious bystander test, as this would
make the implication of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence
impossible.
However the distinction between terms implied in fact and those
implied in law has not been without its critics, for example Andrew Phang
argues that only the narrow officious bystander test is capable of providing
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for example s12-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s1 of the Equal Pay Act 1970.
A custom will be generally implied into a contract if it was generally accepted by
those doing business in the particular trade, at that place and time and a reasonable
observer would be able to discover it. Hutton v. Warren, (1836) 1 M & W 466;
Palgrave, Brown and Sons v. SS Turid (Owners) [1922] 1 A.C. 397. This is an
objective test and it is clear it will apply whether or not the parties actually knew of
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for the necessary degree of certainty. He argues that the distinction between
fact and law, between “the search for an implied term necessary to give
business efficacy to a particular contract and the search, based on wider
considerations, for a term which the law will imply as a necessary incident of
a definable category of contractual relationship”

108

is futile. In Scally v.

Southern Health and Social Services Board, Lord Bridge, however concluded
that, “the criterion to justify an implication of this kind is necessity, not
reasonablness.”109
The implied term of mutual trust and confidence would not easily
have survived the officious bystander test as it is both specified very broadly,
and it is recognized in a much broader class of contracts than previous
implication at law cases had held110
Like Leggatt L.J.’s approach to the interpretation of contractual terms
in Johnstone, the test for the implication of terms in English law is aggressively
formalistic. It shows the same symptoms of skepticism of abstract principles,
or what P.S. Atiyah termed, “explicit theory.” This brings us to a particular
peculiarity of English legal reasoning, which will have large ramifications for
the rest of the analysis. Atiyah is correct when he observes:
“…the truth is that the inclination towards pragmatism, and the aversion to
theory which I have suggested are the characteristics of the English legal
system, turn out to be an aversion to explicit theory rather than an aversion to
all theory. Implicit theories exist all around us in the law and the legal system,
108

Scally v. Southern Health and Social Services Board [1991] 3 W.L.R. 778, 787 per
Lord Bridge of Harwich [hereinafter Scally]
109
Id. at 779
110
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sometimes half acknowledged, sometimes understood but not thought suitable
for discussion, and sometimes probably not appreciated at all. I need hardly
point out that this reliance on implicit theory does not adequately substitute
for an avowed willingness to discuss explicit theory. Experience is, in truth,
no substitute for logic in the appropriate place, a pragmatic emphasis on
remedies is no adequate substitute for an understanding of the rights which
those remedies are invoked to protect, the use of precedent without principle
would render the law a meaningless jumble, and the wholly practical lawyer
without the assistance of the academic would probably do much the same. And
implicit theory is no substitute for explicit theory for the obvious reason that it
is not available for discussion and refutation.”111

This caution towards explicit theory can be seen in the test formulated by the
courts to imply terms. Where terms cannot be imputed to the parties
intentions, as in the business efficacy test, the test permits the courts only to
imply in what is “necessary” rather than what would be reasonable. This
encourages the courts to look for the narrowest language, rather than the best
justification for the term.

This discourages coherence and theoretical

soundness.
Patrick Atiyah argued that “the judicial process serves…two main
functions,” 112 that of individual “dispute settlement,” and what he termed the
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Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, at 148.
Atiyah, Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the
Law, 65 Iowa L Rev 1202 (1980). Also in M.A. Eisebberg, the Nature of the Common
Law (1988) pp4-7 it is noted that the courts have two businesses, that of decising
individual disputes, and of enriching our body of legal norms.
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“hortatory function,” the process by which the law produces incentives and
disincentives for various types of behavior. These two functions, he posits,
produces a tension between principles and pragmatism. English lawyers, he
posits, have a tendency towards embracing pragmatism at the expense of
theoretical and principled coherence. This produces “serious weaknesses in
the common law pragmatic tradition, because of the tendency, sometimes
more and sometimes less pronounced, to concentrate on precedent rather
than principle.”

113

The difference between the hortatory effect of broadly stated
principles, and precise rules can be seen in the recent case of Crossley v.
Faithful and Gould Holdings.114 In this case Dyson L.J. acknowledged that the
test for implication of terms in law is not one of strict “necessity,” but “it is
better to recognize that, to some extent at least, the existence and scope of
standardized implied terms raise questions of reasonableness, fairness and
the balancing of competing policy considerations,”115 although what test he
does propose is unclear. This test is better suited to the implication of terms
such as the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, as it shows a
willingness by the courts to consider interest balancing, and a move towards
the embracing of an approach which welcomes more expansive theoretical
justifications and principles openly into the adjudicative process. Under the
former test of necessity, the courts were in denial about the degree to which
113

Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, 125 See also Elizabeth Peden,
supra note 25, noticed that the strictness of the necessity test can lead to seeming
incoherence; “when the courts focus too intensely on whether a term is “necessary,”
rather than relying on broad principles, the results can be unfortunate.”
114
[2004] EWCA Civ 293, [2004] ICR 1615
115

Id., at para. 36.
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default rules, prescribed by law, were necessary for the operation of a
contract. It belonged to a time of fiction of the agreement as a complete
“meeting of the minds” of the parties. The necessity test had also been allied
to conservative incrementalism

4.1.1

116

Adding principled coherence
However, relaxing the strictness of the “necessity” test for implication

into one which considers “reasonableness and fairness” is not, by itself,
sufficient to bring principled coherence to English contract law. As Atiyah
noted in the passage reproduced above, English courts reluctance to embrace
explicit theory leads them, instead to rely on implicit theory. In order for the
law in this area to be properly understood, however, what is needed is a
justification for the implication of the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence which is not married exclusively to the subjective agreement of the
parties, or a strict incrementalist approach to the court’s role in private law
adjudication.

What is needed is not just, as Dyson L.J. suggested, an

approach which appeals to “policy,” but one which also appeals to
“principle.”
One credible solution lies in the doctrine of good faith, which has been
developed to a much greater degree over the last century in American
contract jurisprudence than by the English courts. This is unsurprising, as
Professor Atiyah observed that “American legal theory is profoundly
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Atiyah, Principles to Pragmatism, supra 112. For an interesting parallel analysis of
the development of American legal thought see Duncan Kennedy, the Rise and Fall of
Classical Legal Thought (1998).
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different to ours,”117 in its openness to principle and theorizing. In England, in
Malik v. BCCI, Lord Nicholls recognized that the implied term of mutual trust
118

and confidence is a “portmanteau obligation.”

Although this description is

clearly true on one level, as the term does operate on the level of individual
dispute settlement as a generalized suitcase full of specific rights, it is
misleading in the sense that it does not appeal to the justifying principles
which drive it. These implicit moral principles are those of reciprocity and
good faith.
Given the breadth of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence,
it is not surprising that the courts have begun to flirt with the rhetoric of good
faith in this area. This is an exciting development as although in 1766 in
Carter v. Boehm, an insurance case, Lord Mansfield famously referred to good
faith as “the governing principle…applicable to all contracts and dealings;”119
from the perspective of the end of the twentieth century Farnsworth notes, in
England “the course of the doctrine of good faith performance has been
downhill”120 since then.
A few of the UK courts have suggested that the mutual obligation of
trust and confidence and good faith are in fact synonymous.

The first

example was in Imperial Group Pension v. Imperial Tobacco,121 where Sir Nicolas
Browne-Wilkinson V-C in the Chancery Division held that employee
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beneficiaries of a company pension scheme were entitled to the protection of
the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. Crucially, he equates this
122

with “the implied obligation of good faith.”

Later in the same paragraph the

Vice Chancellor gives the hypothetical example of where “the company were
to say, capriciously, that it would consent to an increase in the pension
benefits of members of union A but not of union B.” Good faith, in Sir
Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson’s view, is not a test of “whether the company is
acting reasonably.123 The duty of good faith is interpreted to require “that the
company should not exercise its rights for the purpose of coercing that class
(the closed class of employees) to give up its rights under the existing trust.”124
This terminology was also more recently approved of by Lord Steyn in
Eastwood v. Magnox125 and has also been spoken of favorably by some
academic commentators.

126

However the UK courts rarely use the terms interchangeably. This
seems to be due to several misconceptions about the principle of good faith.
Firstly, Lindsay J, a former President of the EAT, suggests that judicial
reluctance is due to the ease of confusing “good faith” with contracts
“uberrimae fidei,”127 however, it would be a shame if lawyers’ inability to
distinguish utmost-good-faith, from good faith, was sufficient to prevent
conceptual coherence within the law. Secondly, and perhaps more clearly in
the courts’ mind, there is a deep seated suspicion that good faith is merely a
122
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subjective test which would lead to unadministrable uncertatinty.128 Douglas
Brodie, for example claims that “the practical difference between the
obligation of good faith and that of mutual trust and confidence would
appear to lie in that the former is subjective,” whereas the implied term of
129

mutual trust and confidence is subjective.

However, this is a misperception of the essence of good faith both in
application in individual cases and as a guiding principle. In the US the
Courts and commentators, although they are often divided on the true
meaning of good faith, are almost unanimous in considering that good faith is
not a purely subjective test.130 However, the US commentators are divided on
how subjective the test for good faith is. This does raise grave issues of
administrability across contract law in general. However, it will be argued
later in this chapter that these concerns can be overcome at the level of rule
application in these fact patterns with the aid of “Situation Sense.”

4.1.2

The English reluctance to embrace principle

128

In Walford v. Miles, [1992] 2 AC 128, the House of Lords energetically denied that
there existed a doctrine of good faith in English Law.
129
Douglas Brodie, The Heart of the matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence, 25 ILJ 121, 128
(1996) . In Malik v. BCCI, supra note 88, Lord Nicholls held that “the conduct
required of a breach must…impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at
objectively, it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and
confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer” at para [14],
my italics.
130
for example, Holdsworth notes that the concept of good faith in the English law of
merchant “put into legal form the religious and moral ideas which, at this period
coloured
the
economic
though
of
all
the
nations
of
Europe
…[therefore]…contributed to enforce those high standard of good faith and fair
dealing which are the very life of the trade.” 5 Holdsworth, A history of English Law
79-81 (2d ed.1937). See section 4.3.2.
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Additionally, the reluctance to recognize good faith may also be due to
the English court’s occasional reluctance to differentiate between principle
and policy. This links up with Atiyah’s observations that English practising
131

lawyers are averse to “explicit theory.”

Ronald Dworkin famously described

the distinction as turning on the fact that “arguments of policy justify a
political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some
collective goal of the community as a whole,” whereas arguments from
principle “secures some individual or group right.”132

This captures one

aspect of the distinction, but it is also important to notice where this leads.
Substantially, arguments from policy tend towards the role of the court as a
settler of individual disputes and are unstructured considerations, arguments
from principle have a higher aim from the hortatory function. However, as
Atiyah notes, the court can never safely ignore the hortatory function entirely
as it exists forever in tension with their role as arbiters of individual disputes.
Hostility to “explicit theory” becomes blindness to “implicit theory” and lack
of coherence in policy arguments.
This can be seen in the way some of the English courts have dealt with
the typical consequentialist policy argument of “floodgates.” This particular
argument, typically raised to combat a newly proposed legal test or an
implied term, alleges that the new formulation would “open the floodgates”
to interminable litigation, radical uncertainty and practical chaos.

131
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See footnote 111.
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treated, on the surface, as an argument that the rule falls foul of overbreadth.
Arguments from “floodgates” tend to involve a combination of empirical
assertions and predictions, and general worries.

One thing this argument

does not generally appeal to is “principle.” In the “rag bag” of prudential
factors mentioned, arguments about hortatory coherence of the law or
principled methods of analysis are left out. As some of the English House of
Lords are increasingly recognizing, arguments from principle appeal to
something higher than prudential balancing; a counter argument alleging that
the principle is overbroad misses the importance of the hortatory effect of the
principle.

134

This is not to say that prudential concerns, such as are often

expressed under the heading of “floodgates” are not valid concerns, as they
clearly are, however, no coherent method is used for assessing their relevance
135

or weight.

Duncan Kennedy notes, at the hortatory level, there is a value in

showing “orderliness” to the debates which are often framed in terms of
policy.136 The general reluctance of the English courts to consider the value in
considering this higher level of ordering, explains a large amount of their
reluctance to recognize the principle of good faith. In mistaking it for a “rule”
they hurl floodgates policy arguments at it. As will be considered later in this
chapter, this criticism fundamentally misunderstands the nature of good
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faith’s operation as a hortatory principle as well as acting in different fact
patterns as a specific rule.

Before we delve into these questions about the nature of good faith,
however, we must first consider the other question raised in this analysis.

4.2 Where does the “reasonable notice” obligation in variation cases come
from?
Richard Pratt has argued that “it is grossly unjust to tell an employee
who has been working for years under such a provision that the handbook
has suddenly changed.”

137

As it was suggested at the end of the second

chapter, this appeal to fairness seems to be intuitively correct. Policy reasons
against the Govier- esque analysis were clearly felt, by the courts in Bankey and
Asmus, as they require reasonable notice of a unilateral variation. However,
the legal basis of this obligation is somewhat unclear. On the analysis in
Asmus, the right to vary a separate unilateral contract without the need for
consideration to flow is an automatic consequence of its nature as unilateral.
However, if this is the case, there seems to be little basis for requiring any
notice, reasonable or not. In at-will contracts, for instance, the essence is that
they are terminable without reasonable notice Although the majority of
employment handbook variation cases are not at-will contracts, at least prior
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to the variation, the reasonable notice requirement cannot be part and parcel
of the fact that the contracts are unilateral.
In Bankey, the court put a large degree of emphasis on the “legitimate
expectations”

of

the

employer.

However,

invocation

of

legitimate

expectations on their own can reduce to a circular appeal to policy as an
expectation of reasonable notice will only be legitimate if the law regards it as
138
subject to entitlement. The “legitimate expectations” analysis does, however,

appeal to a recognition of the employment relationship as an ongoing one.
However this reasoning has mainly been eschewed by courts, who seem to
prefer instead the “traditional”139 contractual analysis.140
Although Toussaint was not a variation case, its characterization of the
relationship as one resting on legitimate expectations does appeal to the
relationship of the parties as a foundation for the obligation. This inquiry is
on more fertile ground than the arid search for whether the handbook is a
unilateral or bilateral contract separate from the contract of employment. It is
important because it notices a counter current to the strongly employer
favoring rhetoric of the at-will presumption.

Recognition of certain

expectations as legitimate is therefore a rhetorical tool for referring to deeper
justifications for the ruling.
138

This is central to the reasoning of cases in the European Court of Justice under the
doctrine of legitimate expectations. See Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche
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Once the invocation of “legitimate expectations” is viewed at the level
of justificatory rhetoric it begins to sound similar to the courts’ invocation of
“good faith.” The need to avoid bad faith is also referred to by the courts in
both Govier and Bankey. The language of good faith is a familiar doctrinal tool
of the US courts in contract cases, contained within the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts and regularly applied in commercial contracts as it is included
within the UCC.

4.2.1

The case for explicit recognition of a doctrine of good faith variation

in employment contracts.
The policy justifications for recognizing a rule requiring at least
reasonable notice have already been considered at the end of the second
chapter. There are also several compelling reasons why the doctrine of good
faith should be invoked more freely by the courts as the underlying rationale
for imposing these obligations on the employer.
Not only does good faith give a doctrinal basis for regulating the
variation of employee handbooks, its explicit recognition also adds coherence
to the area of law as a whole. It appeals to the relationship as one of
mutuality, where the employer’s ongoing control over the employee is
tempered by an obligation to exercise that control in good faith. As we have
seen, in England the implied term of mutual trust and confidence grew up as
a term of symmetricality with the employees duties of loyalty and
cooperation to the employer. In return for faithful service, the employer
exercises control over the employee, which must be exercised in a manner,
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which does not destroy the relationship of mutual trust and confidence
between the parties. US law clearly recognizes one half of the obligations in
this relationship, that of the employer’s control; for example, this used as the
central test for distinguishing between employees and independent
141

contractors.

4.2.2

Good faith interpretation
Secondly, recognition of the principle of good faith in one area of the

regulation of the employment contract, it can also unify it with another. As
we saw in Johnstone, good faith can play an important role in the
interpretation of contracts. This can be seen on the facts of the US case of
Tymshare v. Covell, where an employer attempted to make use of a broad
discretionary power in bad faith to deprive an employee commission sales
representitive of a benefit.

142

In 1980 Covell’s sale quota was set at $1.2million

in the expectation that it would be a successful year. However, problems
ensued and Tymshare reduced Covell’s quota to $815,000 in Spring 1980.
Covell’s projected earnings, were therefore approximately $31,000. In the fall,
however, business boomed and Covell’s commissions bloomed.

In

December, before Covell had been paid his newly earned commission,
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Cal. App. 4th 354, 66 call. Rptr.2d 921 (1997)
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Tymshare produced a revised quota plan in order to eliminate the increase.
th
Covell’s employment was terminated on December 20 . Covell claimed that

the discretion under the plan had not been exercised in good faith, contrary to
Virginia law. As his accounts included contracts with the United States Postal
Service the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that they had
jurisdiction under the District of Columbia to hear the case. This quirk of
factual circumstances permitted Circuit Judge Scalia, as he then was, to write
an academically dense judgment.143
He agrees explicitly both with Professor Summers and Farnsworth’s
accounts of good faith, (which will be discussed further below). Taking these
two together he argues that “when these two insights are combined, it
becomes clear that the doctrine of good faith performance is a means of
finding within a contract an implied obligation not to engage in the particular
form of conduct which, in the case at hand constitutes “bad faith.” He sees
this as consistent with the principle of “honoring the reasonable expectations
created by the autonomous expressions of the contracting parties” although
“the new formulation may have more appeal to modern taste since it purports
to rely directly upon considerations of morality and public policy.”
Interestingly, he uses the principle of good faith as a technique of
contractual interpretation.

Tymshare had argued that their contractual

143
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discretion permitted them to alter the benefit scheme in this way. However
Circuit Judge Scalia held that this interpretation would “require such a degree
of folly on the part of these sales representatives we are not inclined to posit
144

where another plausible interpretation of the language is available.”

The

contract cannot be interpreted such as to take away the benefits which the
employee has bargained for. This is similar to the formulation of good faith
set out in the old case of Kirke La Shelle v. Paul Armstrong Co that:
“in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'145
Not only ins the formulation of good faith in Kirke la Shelle very similar
146
to the formulation of the EAT in Courtaulds Northern Textiles v. Andrew, that

an employer must not act so as to destroy the relationship of mutual trust and
confidence, but Circuit Judge Scalia’s application of these principles to the
case is very similar to that taken recently in the English case of Mallone v. BPP
Industries.147
Mallone was an executive of BPP’s Italian subsidiary until 1995. His
contract contained an executive share option scheme. However, when he was
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dismissed in 1995, BPP informed him that his share option was zero. At trial
Christopher Symons Q.C., sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, held that the
contractual discretion under the employment contract did not entitle them to
cancel the option scheme once it had been held for three years. In the Court of
Appeal Mr Mallone’s counsel argued that the directors’ discretion was not
exercised in “good faith.” Rix L.J. held for the court that the contractual
language could “in theory embrace an exercise of the directors’ discretion in
relation to mature as well as immature options.” However, he then went on
to consider whether the exercise of the discretion was “irrational.” In Clark v.
148

Nomura,

Burton J. had held that employer’s discretions are “not

unfettered…a simple discretion whether to award a bonus must not be
exercised capriciously.”

This, he equated, with a test of “irrationality or

perversity” borrowed from the Administrative law context, “whether any
reasonable employer could have come to that conclusion.” As in this case,
“there is no sign any regard was had to the fact the options were clearly
granted at a time when Mr Mallone’s performance was clearly regarded as
excellent….I have no difficultly in saying that the judge was entitled to find
that the committee’s decision was one which no reasonable employer could
have reached.”
Although Rix L.J. never sounds entirely comfortable with the term
“good faith,” using it only twice in his judgment; preferring to consider
specific types of dishonesty, improper purpose or arbitrariness, they are
clearly talking of virtually indistinguishable tests.
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Neither of these is an instance of the use of contra proferentum
construction.
In 1994 Professor, now the Honourable Mr Justice, Jack Beatson wrote
that “Contract law…has not been influenced by public law principles or by
149

the rules of statutory regulatory regimes.”

However, were he to write the

same article now, after Mallone, he could no longer claim this to be the case.
The analogy to administrative law is interesting, and one which links
up well with the approach of Scalia J in Tymshare. In Tymshare, some of Scalia
C.J.’s language could be mistaken for that of an administrative law judgment.
For example he states that , “the language need not…be read to confer
discretion to reduce the quota for any reason.”150 The contract is treated as an
autonomous document, which has “purpose implicitly envisioned” in it.151
However, we must consider whether it is wise for a theory of the
interpretation of contracts to borrow a theory of statutory interpretation?
Attempts to borrow theories in the opposite direction have rarely been
uncontroversial.152

Statutory

interpretation

involves

more

problematic

questions of divining legislative intention than contractual interpretation, as a
statute is the product of the entire legislative process, and the work of many
minds.

Ronald Dworkin persuasively argues that a theory of statutory

interpretation cannot be “conversational;” a search for the subjective state of
mind of the legislature is both doomed to failure and inconclusive. He points
149

Jack Beatson, Public Law Influences in Contract Law in Good Faith and Fault in
Contract Law (Beatson & Friedmann eds, 1995), 265, 288.
150
Tymshare, supra note 142, at 1145
151
Tymshare, supra note 142 at 1155
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See further Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”? The
Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C.L. Rev. 1145.
58

to the problems facing an intentionalist judge in determining who the true
authors of a statute are, how they combine together, and whether their mental
153

state is relevant beyond their expressions in the wording of the statutes.

He echoes Max Radin’s pessimism that “the intention of the legislature is
undiscoverable.”154
Contracts, on the other hand have far fewer of these particular
problems. They tend not to be the product of so many minds. The law
repeatedly asserts that freedom of contract means freedom for the parties to
contract for whatever they subjectively intend. However, even though the
law grants this freedom, this does not necessarily mean that parties have
exhaustively exercised it. If, as in the case of a discretion, the limits to which
the parties have bound themselves are unclear, we are not dealing with a
question of limiting “freedom of contract,” as the parties have not committed
themselves either way.

Although it may initially seem that Dworkin’s

conception of “conversational interpretation” is of most relevance to the
interpretation of contracts, the similarities between contract and statutes
become clearer and it appears that constructive interpretation is more suitable
as a technique, given the creation of the “contract” as a separate entity to the
“conversational” negotiations. The language of administrative statutory
interpretation, therefore, seems to be particularly apt in this case. Its
155

congruence with the principle of good faith is clear.

153
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4.2.3

Alternatives

After considering the case for evaluating good faith as a doctrinal basis for the
reasonable notice criterion we must consider some of the other options which
have already been suggested.
ingenious solution.

A note, by Brian T. Kohn, argues for an

He suggests that “courts should imply into all

unilaterally adopted employee policies a subsidiary promise by the employer
not to modify that policy.”

156

He refers to a term implied in law recognized

by the Californian Supreme Court in Drennan v. Star Paving Co,157 in the
context of a contractor relying on a subcontractor’s bid in preparing its own.
He notes that this has been used once in the employment pension context by
the Oregon Supreme Court to imply a subsidiary contract not to revoke a
unilateral offer of a retirement plan.158 He argues that, as the courts have had
no reluctance in implying terms in to the contract favoring the employer,159
there is no legal impediment to them implying a subsidiary promise not to
vary into the contract too.
Kohn is on promising ground by looking to implied terms to solve this
problem.

However, this proposal runs into several potential pitfalls by

relying on cross fertilization between areas of law, without deriving it from an
overarching principle.

To use the terminology of Karl Llewellyn, Kohn’s

Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory
Interpretation, 87 Geo. L.J. 195.
156
Kohn, supra note 34, at 843.
157
333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958)
158
Taylor v. Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff’s Retirement Board 510 P2d. 339 (0r
1973)
159
For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Ferrara v. Nielson 799 P.2d 458
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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proposal is open to attack from situation sense. Kohn attempts to borrow a
term across different fact patterns only by analogy. Analogous references are
most successful across fact patterns which are as similar as possible. This type
of reasoning is open to the attack that another term is instead more suitable
from a nearer fact pattern. As in Ferrara, a court could instead import an
alternative formulation of the at-will presumption.

This is a condition

transported from a closer fact pattern than Kohn’s analogies to bids and the
early pension case.
However Kohn’s suggestion gains weight if we counter that argument
with one which goes one step deeper, and appeal to a principled theoretical
basis for implying such options in to the contract. This is where the principle
of good faith can play its role.
A similar suggestion is offered by Jason Walters.

160

He argues that

handbooks in at-will contracts can be modified at any time as the offer by the
employer of employment may be terminated at any time. As unilateral offers
cannot be revoked when performance is continuing he argues that in at-will
contracts the employer may determine at any time that performance is
complete. Where a handbook term, however, gives assurances to job security,
however, the situation is different.

He argues that, in this situation,

performance cannot be deemed complete simply at the whim of either party,
therefore the terms of the offer of employment may not be revoked or altered
while the employee is still performing the contract.

160

Jason A. Walters, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract
Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32 Cumb. L. Rev. 375
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There are several problems with this analysis. Firstly it is premised on
the idea that contracts of employment must be unilateral contracts.

The

necessity for this is far from clear. As there is clearly an exchange of promises
when the contract is formed, it could just as easily be analysed as a bilateral
contract. Given the mutuality of obligations on both parties in the contract it
is more appealing to analyse the contract of employment on bilateral
principles. Only where a bilateral exchange of promises does not take place
161

should unilateral contract analysis be applied.
However,

even assuming

that

unilateral contract

analysis

is

appropriate in these situations, Walters’ conclusions do not flow as simply
from his premises as he suggests. His claim that, in an at-will contract, an
employer may deem performance complete at any time, therefore may
extinguish the obligations at any time is undoubtably true. However, it is too
formalistic to assume that an attempted variation is functionally the same as a
termination.

Although the end result of a successful variation will be a

variation in the terms of the initial offer, it is too rigid to maintain that a
termination has taken place at the moment of variation. For example, time
accrued under the Family and Medical Leave Act 1993 (which requires a
worker to have been employed for at least twelve months and have at least 1,
250 hours of service in the twelve month period preceding leave) would be

161

See further on the case for bilateral analysis of employee handbook cases: Richard
J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further
Encroachments on the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 197 (1990).
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most unlikely to be held to be interrupted by a variation of the other terms of
162

employment during that time.

There are clear differences between variation and termination, which
have been suggested in Chapter 2 and will be analysed further in Chapter 4 of
this paper. Because of this, Walters’ contention that the employer may deem
performance to be adequate is not of itself sufficient to demonstrate that the
employer should be permitted to vary the contract unilaterally, at any time
and without notice.

4.3

If both are explainable by good faith, what does good faith mean?
We have repeatedly been colliding with the question of the meaning of

good faith means in the various fact patterns of the preceding analysis.
However, before progressing any further, the time has come to consider the
broader question of what good faith, may mean in general. However,
although the question sounds as though it is simple, the answer is likely not
to be. As Professor Farnsworth has noted, “if, as Professor Goode suggests,
the English have difficulty in attaching any meaning to good faith, the
difficulty in my country is quite the opposite: the Americans have, or so it
might seem, too many meanings of good faith.”

163

Before turning to the issue

of how best to conceptualise good faith, however, it is helpful to consider a
brief general overview of how “good faith” fits into US law.

4.3.1
162
163

Good faith in US law

Family and Medical Leave Act 1993 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611 (2).
Farnsworth in Beatson & Friedman supra note 120, at 161
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Lawyers in the US are no strangers to the invocation of “good faith.”
The classic formulation of good faith is from the 1933 case of Kirke La Shelle
Co., v. Paul Armstrong Co., has already been considered. This provides that
parties are precuded by the doctrine of doing anything “which will have the
effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits
164

of the contract.

The U.C.C., which applies to commercial contracts, and not to contracts
of service, a general duty such that:

“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement.” Section 1-203.

There are two standards specifying the duty of good faith, which seem to
offer slightly different conceptions of the provision. Section 1-201(19) defines
good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned,”
whereas Section 2-103 (1) (b), which applied only to contracts of sale, good
faith is defined as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.” The second definition
explicitly recognizes an objective element, in addition to a consideration of the
subjective motivation of the parties.165 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
recognizes that good faith “excludes a variety of types of conduct
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Kirke La Shelle, supra note 145.
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characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”

4.3.2

166

Academic debate over good faith
However, commentators in the US have been debating the meaning of

“good faith” for over fifty years. As Robert S. Summers noted, “general
definitions of good faith either spiral into the Charybdis of vacuous generality
or collide with the Scylla or restrictive specificity.”167 In the search for a
“meaning” for good faith, however, many of the commentators have strayed
far from the reason for adopting the principle in the first place.
Professor Farnsworth has argued that, in good faith performance,
“good faith has nothing to do with a state of mind – with innocence, suspicion
or notice. Here the inquiry goes to decency, fairness or reasonableness.” The
“chief utility of the concept of good faith performance has always been as a
rationale in a process …that of implying terms.”168 The doctrine of good faith
results in “an implied term of the contract requiring cooperation on the part
of one party to the contract is that another party will not be deprived of his
reasonable expectations.”169
In 1968 Robert S. Summers published a highly influential article, which
claimed that “good faith” must be defined negatively. He argued that “in
contract law, taken as a whole, good faith is an “excluder;” “it is a phrase
without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a
166

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205, Cmts., A and D.
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wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.” 170 A focus on defining the
positive content of good faith from the case-law is therefore doomed to be
more difficult as “the typical judge who uses this phrase is primarily
concerned with ruling out specific conduct, and only secondarily, or not at all,
with formulating the positive content of a standard.”

171

Justice John Priestly JA in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v. Minister for Public Works,172 described
Summers’ approach as having “the great merit of being workable, without
involving the use of fictions often resorted to by the courts where the good
faith obligation is not available, and reflects what actually happens in decision
making. Just as Lord Nicholls described the obligation of mutual trust and
confidence as a “portmanteau,” this is a very traditional English/
Commonwealth Common law way of embracing good faith in that it stresses
the pragmatic over the principled. It is not surprising that Judge Priestly
finds that looking at the individual concrete instances of good faith can be a
useful tool in deciding when to apply it to cases.
However, the interesting question, if Summers’ analysis is to be
accepted, is whether anything in particular unites these separate instances
under the principle of good faith at all.173 Summers does offer a general
conceptualization;
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“In most cases the party acting in bad faith frustrates the justified
expectations of another…the ways in which he may do this are numerous and
174

radically diverse.”

This sounds similar to the Court’s invocation of legitimate expectations of the
parties in Toussaint and Bankey. However, a crucial issue with a justification
based on expectations is which particular expectations will be regarded as
legitimate.
This is a particularly important factor to consider with regard Steven
Burton’s analysis of good faith. He suggests that the doctrine of good faith is
premised on the need to enforce the justifiable expectations of the parties
when the contract was formed.175

Burton’s theory has the advantage of

explicitly resting on the recognition that contracts are incomplete ex ante.176
Even contractual discretions are naturally incomplete. The obligation of good
faith, therefore operates as a “gap filler.” A party ‘performs in bad faith by
using discretion in performance for reasons outside the justified expectations
of the parties arising from their agreement.”177
It might initially seem that there is little to tell between Burton and
Summers, as both ultimately rely on the expectations of the parties. However
Summers and Burton clearly considered themselves to be in disagreement.178
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One of the crucial aspects of disagreement is over the relevant timing of the
expectations. Burton’s stress is upon the moment of contracting. He argued
that “bad faith performance occurs precisely when discretion is use to
recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting.”

179

Although Summers is

not entirely clear on this point, his concept of good faith involves taking into
account expectations and hopes formed after the initial moment of contract
formation.

One way of understanding this conception is that good faith

legitimates expectations ex post, rather than recapturing those formed ex
ante. Summer’s reference to “justified expectations” is rather unfortunate in
that it seems to suggest that the expectations are justified at the moment when
they are formed rather than deemed to be so later in the life of the dispute.
Burton also characterizes Summers as advocating an approach which
appeals to morality, rather than to the agreement of the parties. However,
Burton rather overestimates the “agreement” between the parties. As in the
interpretation of statutes which we considered above, the search for complete
“intended meaning” is often as futile as resorting to palmistry. As with
legislative intent “we have no means of knowing that content except by the
external utterances or behaviour,”180 but more often than not the exact issue in
question has not had any direct thought put to it at all. As Ronald Dworkin
notes, we can attempt to glean presumed intention by engaging in elaborate
counterfactualising; what would X have thought had they thought about it.
However, this kind of question also spirals off into wild speculation.181
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A common answer to this problem in the area of statutory
interpretation is to invoke a presumption of rationality and good faith of the
182

legislature.

If we resolve questions about the interpretation of contracts by

presuming good faith, we are appealing to a long standing tradition.
However, the courts on both sides of the Atlantic are still wedded to the
conception of the contract as the “meeting of minds.” Both in the
interpretation of contracts and the implication of terms this is not the case.
Mark Freedland explains the reluctance of the courts in implying terms which
also goes for interpretation:
“when the process of ascertainment of implied terms actually involves creative
law making, the real difficulty presents itself that the courts and tribunals are
reluctant to evolve positive rationales for that creative law making because
they are committed to disclaiming the creative law-making role.”183
Burton is therefore mistaken in referring to the subjective expectations
of the parties before the formation of the contract. As Todd Rakoff has noted,
the language of “intention” and “intended meaning” in contract is a
“ceremonial bow” to private autonomy “answering the needs of ideological
184

justification rather than a realistic description.”

A system which requires

such obsequious devotion to a fiction, at the expense of principled coherence,
is storing up trouble for any future developments.
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4.3.3. The several faces of good faith: a return to Llewellyn
It is helpful to go back, for a moment, to the founding father of the
UCC, Karl Llewellyn. Llewellyn’s influential work in the 1930s, like Max
Radin’s, had been distinctly within the legal realist movement.185 One of the
tenets of this movement, he recognized as “the distrust of verbally simple
186

rules.”

In his early work he advocated “the worthwhileness of grouping

cases and legal situations into narrower categories than has been the practice
in the past,” as deductive reasoning from abstract general legal concepts was
doomed to indeterminacy and failure. This approach seems to be distinctly at
the “dispute settlement” end of Atiyah’s tension. Even in his later work,
where he eschews the realist “dirges” in favour of “situation sense,”187 he
remains wedded to a pragmatic commitment to “type-facts in their context.”
What is someone who distrusts “verbally simple rules” and ascribes to such
fact dependent pragmatism doing advocating a principle as abstract as that of
“good faith and fair dealing” within the UCC?

The key to this question

appears to be what he considered to be the purpose good rule making:
“The way to write good law is to indicate what you want to do, and you
assume within reason that the persons the law deals with will try to be decent;
then after that, you lay down the edges to take care of the dirty guys and try to
hold them in, which means that every statute ought to have two essential
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bases, one to show where the law wants you to go, and one to show where we
will put you if you don’t.”188
He criticizes lawyers for focusing only on the second sense of rule making. As
these two facets of the law are inevitable, we should celebrate the functions of
good faith in the first sense of Llewellyn’s distinction. We can see this
function in practice, in its usage as an interpretative tool in the construction of
contracts. Llewellyn’s second sense is more consonant with Summers’
excluder analysis; the doctrine of good faith can also be used to prescribe
“dirty” conduct, for example in this situation, the immediate variation and
depriving of rights in employee handbooks. Read in this manner good faith is
fully consistent with requirements of situation sense.
In an interesting comparative work on legal reasoning in the US and
189

UK, Summers

and Atiyah writing in tandem conclude that the formulation

of good faith is a “principle.”190 Such principles “generate highly substantive
reasons…upon which private persons may act in the conduct of their
191

ordinary affairs.”

They concede that such principles conflict.

It is in

instances of conflict that the legal system comes to recognize such principles
as law. On recognition as such it becomes, not only a substantive reason, but
a formal reason, but only in that fact pattern. They note that “there can be
little doubt that lawmakers, judges and other officials in the American system
resort far more often to such principles directly and indirectly, as forms of valid

188
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law, than is true in the English system.”192 Although he is often though of as a
pragmatist, there is ample space for principle in Llewellyn’s theory. This is
demonstrated by one of his most elegant passages on statutory interpretation

“a court must strive to make sense as a whole out of our law as a whole. It
must…take the music of any statute as written by the legislature…but there
are many ways to play that music, and a court’s duty is to play it well and in
193

harmony with the other music of the legal system.”

This another moment where we can see that the English court’s
treatment of “floodgates” arguments against good faith miss the point of
principle. As principles are able to generate and justify substantive reasons
for certain substantive or procedural outcomes, rather than just prudential
considerations and narrow defining terms they are not just operating simply
at the level of rule application. Although, in the individual dispute the parties
will have arguments mainly of policy concerning their fact pattern, arguments
of principle cannot be ignored for hortatory purposes of the common law
method.
A situation sense reading can also allay some of the fears of
unadministrability of so broad a standard as good faith.

If Summers is

correct, and at the level of rule application good faith does operate as an
excluder to prevent various specific types of bad faith conduct, there may be
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certainty about the operation of good faith in that particular fact pattern. This
paper is considering two particular fact patters, that of variation of handbook
terms, and that of interpretation of the express terms of the contract of
employment. In these fact patterns the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence has not proved to be excessively unadministrable and has been
194

mostly well received.

This situation sensitive analysis will be crucial to the argument in the
next chapter that at-will and good faith variation can survive side by side.

194

See further, The Honourable Mr Justice Lindsay, The Implied Term of Mutual Trust
and Confidence, supra note 90.
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5.

Interrelations with at-will: a route through the tensions

The argument in this Chapter will suggest that, although at the level of
principles at-will appears to be moving along a different vector from that of
good faith performance, the proposed development, need not substantively
change the scope of the at-will rule. It will only limit the “at-will principle.”
The at-will rule in the US has come under a barrage of criticism for
decades.195 In the 1980s, one state, Montana, enacted legislation providing for
a statutory remedy to unfair dismissal.196 Some states also have developed an
exception to at-will based on good faith.197 However, since then, no other state
has followed suit, and the courts have increasingly become less willing to
develop common law exceptions to the rule.

It would therefore be

reasonable to assume that the courts are committed to the survival of this rule
for the foreseeable future; therefore if recognition of a good faith restriction on
variation would practically eliminate it, the courts would be much less
inclined to recognize reasonable notice in variation as an instance of this
doctrine. This chapter argues that good faith in variation does not eliminate
the rule of at-will presumption in employment contracts.

To do this,

however, it must proceed first set out why this might be a problem.
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5.1.

Fire and rehire
There is a dominant shadow behind the question of variation of the

employment contract; to what extent does regulation of the variation within
the contract become practically meaningless if the employer is free to fire and
then rehire employees on substantially different (and less favorable) terms.
The interest in flexibility in US employment law is often seen as, to a large
extent, protected by the presumption that a contract is “at-will,” thus
permitting either the employer or employee to terminate the contract with no
notice.

An employer, under an at-will contract, is therefore afforded

flexibility by the ability to fire and then rehire employees on new terms. In
198

England, there is no at-will presumption, but the Catamaran Cruises

case

demonstrates that similar considerations also arise within English law.

5.1.1

The US story
In the majority of US states, an employer is free to terminate an

employment relationship without notice and then offer reemployment on
different terms. An employer is also free to threaten an employee with total
termination without reingagement if the new terms are not agreed to. The
classic formulation of the rule was stated by Horace G. Wood:

“With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at-will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
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is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption
attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time
the party may serve. It is competent for either party to show what the mutual
understanding of the parties was in reference to the matter; but unless their
understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and
definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either
party…”199

5.1.2

The English story
In order to see how this tension also appears with English law it is

necessary to give a summary of the rather complex law in this area.200 English
law has both common law and statutory mechanisms of dealing with the end
of the employment relationship. The common law action of wrongful dismissal
stems from the presumption that servants in agriculture were hired for a fixed
201
term of one year . If an employer fires an employee without notice she is

liable for the wages for the notice period. These damages are subject to the
duty to mitigate.202

An employer may only terminate without notice

199

See H.G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant § 134, at 272, supra
note 4.
200
For further details see Simon Deakin and Gillian S. Morris, Labour Law (3d ed
2001) Ch5; Harvey supra note 70.
201
Deakin and Morris, Labour Law, (3d ed 2001) 393. This rule has its origins in the
Statute of Artificers of 1563 and the poor laws of the seventeenth century
202
Gunton v. Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [1980] I.C.R. 755, 722
(Buckley LJ).
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(summary dismissal) where the employee is guilty of gross misconduct.203 To
confuse matters, these notice periods are calculated by statute.204 Like the “atwill” rule, this notice requirement also purports to be symmetrical. An
employee must therefore give notice before resigning, as the employer can
give notice of dismissal. Reason for termination has no role to play in an
action for wrongful dismissal, except in the case where the employer is
claiming that they have summarily dismissed the employee in response to
known gross misconduct.

This, however, is a simple application of the

principles of repudiatory breach.

If the employee has “disregarded the

essential conditions of the contract of service”205 the employer is entitled to
accept this repudiation as termination of the contract.
The statutory concept of unfair dismissal has been present on UK law
since the Industrial Relations Act in 1971. This action permits an evaluation of
the reasons for dismissal if an employee has been continuously employed for
more than one year206.

This is now governed by Part X of the Employment

Rights Act 1996. An employer is under a duty to show that the dismissal of
an employee is due to a reason which:
(a)

Is related to the capability or qualifications of the employee
for performing work of the kind which he was employed by
the employer to do (s98(2)(a)),

(b)

relates to the conduct of the employee (s98(2)(b)),

203

And, after the Employment Act 2002, after the employer has operated a shortened
disciplinary procedure as set out in the regulations to the Employment Act 2002,
Sched 3.
204
S. 86 et seq. of the Employment Rights Act 1996
205
Laws v. London Chronicle, supra note WHICH 700 (per Lord Evershed M.R.).
206
s 108 Employment Rights Act 1996
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(c)

is that the employee was redundant (s 98(2)(c), this is dealt
with under Part XI of the Employment Rights Act 1996)

(d)

is that the employee could not continue to work in the
position which he held without contravention (either on his
part or that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed
by or under an enactment. (s98(2)(d))

(e)

or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify
the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the
employee held. (s98(1)(b))

In addition the statute provides for various protected grounds which are
207

automatically unfair.”

Returning to Catamaran Cruises; in that case the employer had fired his
employees and then offered them much less favorable contracts as a result of
financial difficulties.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the

dismissal was not unfair as it was within the “band of reasonable responses”
for “some other substantial reason” (s98(1)(b)).

The EAT held that the

employees had been unreasonable not to have accepted the new terms. The
test, post Catamaran Cruises, is essentially one of balancing the interests. What

207

A list of automatically unfair reasons for dismisal: procedures under Schedule 2 to
the Employment Act 2002 has not been completed (s98A); pregnancy, childbirth or
maternity, maternity leave, parental leave, paternity leave, adoption leave (s99);
actions as a heath and safety respresentitive (s100); shop workers refusal to work on
a Sunday (s101); complaint under the working time regulations (s101A); actions as
the trustee of an occupational pension scheme (s102); being an employee
representitive under Chapter II of Part IV of the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) 1992); making a protected disclosure (s103A);
assertion of a statutory right under s86 ERA, S68, 86, 146, 168, 168A, 169 and 170 of
TULRCA (s 104); action taken with a view to enforcing the national minimum wage
(s104A); action taken with a view to enforcing s25 Tax Credits Act 2002 (s104B);
requesting flexible working (s104C).
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is clear, however, is that an employer is relatively safe to attempt to fire and
then rehire, if it is rationally connected with a business reason and is not
motivated by sharp practice. Since Catamaran Cruises, the Employment Act
2002 requires in addition that the minimal standard disciplinary and
dismissal procedure set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2 is carried out in addition to
the appropriate notice period, however these guarantees are only procedural
208

rather than substantive.

The shadow that both of these situations spread across any regulation
of the conduct of the parties within the relationship, is whether any such
regulation can be destroyed by the ease by which the parties can terminate
the relationship.

Also, if regulation of terminations are governed by a

principle which moves in one direction, how successful can a principle of
good faith which moves along quite a different vector fare where the factual
circumstances are closely interrelated?

Any regulation of the modes of

variation must inevitably take into account how it will fit with any provision
for the regulation of termination.

5.2

Hortatory principles and rule-application

208

This is a 3 step procedure requiring a statement of grounds for action and
invitation to meeting, meeting and opportunity for appeal meeting. Failure to
comply with these procedures makes any resulting dismissal automatically unfair
and subject to either reduction or inflation of the award by between 10-50%
(depending on which party is at fault in causing this failure), S. 31 Employment Act
2002. See also Bob Hepple Q.C. and Gillian S. Morris, The Employment Act 2002 and
the Crisis of Individual Employment Rights (2002) 31 I.L.J. 245
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Although Justice Holmes cautioned, “general propositions do not decide
concrete cases,”

209

questions of principle are unavoidable in adjudication. As

Atiyah notes, “in the process of generalization, principles also attempt to give
some overall structure, or rational shape to the law, not just in the interests of
elegance but in the interests of consistency, of the desire to ensure that like is
treated alike.”210
It is crucial that the principle of good faith be recognized and utilized
as a principle, not only in interpretation of contracts, but in the interpretation
of contract doctrine itself.

The hortatory function of good faith is an

important counter balance against the pervasive hortatory function of the
presumption of at-will termination. Both rules can, nevertheless, coherently
coexist at the level of pragmatic rules within bounded spheres for pragmatic
application. For their role as principles, however, their conflict, far from
being fatal, is important for the safeguarding of coherent balance between
flexibility and certainty in course of employment. At least part of the success
of the recognition of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence has been
because of its hortatory function.
The hortatory effect of at-will is strong in US law. We can see its
hortatory effect in the cases where the courts refuse to accept the possibility of
a handbook exception to at-will. Although this hortatory fertilization has
largely slipped in unnoticed in cases like Govier and in Jones V.C.J.’s dissent in
Demasse, it has been resisted by some courts. They have noted that extension
of the rationales applied to at-will do not extend naturally into the variation
209
210

Justice Holmes dissent in Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539,76 (1905)
Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, at 27.

80

cases as, “the cases which reason that the at-will rule takes precedence over
even explicit job termination restraints, simply because the contract is of
indefinite duration, misapply the at-will rule of construction as a rule of
211

substantive limitation on contract formation."

However this formal

argument seems to be but a frail twig against the tide of much of the courts’
strong rhetoric of laissez faire and individual autonomy.

Nevertheless,

instances of good faith are visible, and indeed unavoidable in the
jurisprudence of employment contracts.

5.3

The ramifications of conflict
Duncan Kennedy has recognized a tension in Private Law adjudication

between individualism and altruism.212 He notices that both contradictory
visions which “emerge as biases or tendencies whose proponents have much
in common and a large basis for adjustment through analysis of the
particularizes of fact situations.”213 He notes that “there is a connection in the
rhetoric of private law between individualism and a preference for rules, and
between altruism and a preference for standards.”

This is not the same

tension, as the one described above. In the Atiyah-esque tension between the
hortatory power of a principle of good faith and the situation specific
211

Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983)
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication 89 Harv L Rev
1685 (1976). Another interesting discussion of tension in the context of implied terms
is contained in, Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
Maryland. L. Rev. 563 (1982)
212

213

Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication 89 Harv L Rev
1685, 1776 (1976).
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application of a rule applied at its lowest level of abstraction, the abstract does
not correlate with a more altruistic vision. In current US employment law the
principle of at will termination is pervasive at the abstract level through the
rhetoric of flexibility. However, Kennedy’s essay is helpful for this one in that
he sees conflict at the level of hortatory principle as unavoidable. The process
of law, therefore must be able to go forward in light of this interminable
conflict. Claire Dalton notes that theoretical duality exist in tension
214

throughout contract law.

However, despite this conflict she concludes that

doctrinal talk is not “meaningless”215
Recognition of conflict between hortatory principles can be important
for coherence at the level of rules. Although the modes of individualism and
altruism, as described by Kennedy, do conflict at the highest level, this does
not mean that appeal to one mode, automatically annihilates doctrines which
have a shade of the other.
To see how lawyers can get through this, it should also be remembered
that tension at the level of principle does not translate exactly into tension at
the level of rule application. Judges and legislators are not aiming at creating
a mirror of a just society in the rules; these rules must be practicable and be
likely to produce these effects. Ramifications at the level of principle can take
on a different shade at the level of rule application. Although it is relatively
easy to state a rule which would solve the case, ex post facto, it is much more

214

Clare Dalton, Deconstructing Contract Doctrine 994 Yale. L.J. 997 (1985) especially at
1007.
215
Dalton, Deconstructing Contract at 1009. Ronald Dworkin also gives the argument,
that conflict leads to insoluability, short shrift in Law’s Empire (1986, 441-444 in
footnote 20).
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difficult to state one which would prevent it occurring ex ante. As Scott and
Krauss note, there is a difference between a rule, which is consistent with
legal and moral principle but which may nevertheless have perverse incentive
effects. This, it is argued, is captured in the essence of situation sense
methodology.

Llewellyn’s Delphic comment, that situation sense is a

compound of “Isness and Oughtness and what have you more,”

216

can be

understood as acknowledging this dimension to the deciding of cases.217

5.4.

The rationalisation
To argue that the at-will rule in application is not impossible in a

system which recognizes the principle of good faith, we must consider some
of the differences between the situations of dismissal, fire and then rehire, and
variation, as was attempted in Govier, Asmus, Bankey and Demasse. Returning
again to “situation sense” the rule must be applied to “type facts in their
context.” We must now look at those contexts in detail to see how they can be
distinguished from one another coherently.

5.4.1

The argument from situation sense
Although it is clearly moving along a different vector at the level of

principle, at the level of rule application the recognition of an obligation of
good faith in variation of employment contracts does not necessarily subsume

216

Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960) at 61
Although it should be acknowledged that this is a very different route from the
one proposed by Kennedy. For an example of his response to this conflict in
individual dispute resolution see, Duncan Kennedy, Freedom & Constraint in
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Leg. Ed. 518 (1986)
217
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the presumption of at-will termination.

Although the vast majority of

employment cases which consider “good faith” do so in the context of
termination, this does not mean that good faith in variation will naturally
become a doctrine of good faith termination.

These actions can be kept

analytically distinct; they are different “type facts.”
A host of different considerations arise when we are considering issues
of termination as opposed to variation. This will be particularly so when we
are considering a contract which provides specific restrictions on termination;
for these to be variable at-will would negate any reason for the employee to
have bargained for those enhanced terms. These considerations have already
been analysed in Chapter 2. Breach of terms providing for added constraints
on termination do not automatically bring the contract to an end, without
more; the employee can still legitimately expect performance of the other
218

contract terms.

There are many reasons why an employer may wish to do this, for
example if they are needing to accrue the necessary length of service with that
one employer to be eligible for FMLA leave.219 The employer also may wish
to vary the contract, but not to lose all of the benefits inherent in the
relationship itself. As was considered above, the employer, in the course of
employment has “control” over the employee (or it does not constitute a
contract of employment at all, and is merely a contract for services).

An

employer in notifying employees of a variation is communicating an intention

218

Provided that the employee does not elect to accept this fundamental breach as
effecting repudiation.
219
See footnote 162.
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to maintain that control. It is true that an employee can legally bring the
relationship to an end at any time, but from the point of view of employee
perception, a manifest intention on the part of the employer to maintain
control may seem to be very different from a manifest intention by them to
terminate. To treat all variations as if they terminate the entire relationship
would be to ignore these relevant considerations.

5.4.2. The argument from autonomy
Also the principle of at-will termination is often justified by reference
220

to considerations of autonomy.

In the passage quoted from Horace Wood in

the previous chapter it is clear that, if parties wish to vary the legal default of
at-will, they are free to contract around it. In most of the cases cited in this
paper the contractual term at issue was a variation of the default, to require
for cause termination or LIFO. The principal of autonomy respects the liberty
of the parties to contract out of any default they wish to provided there is
agreement and consideration. The rule in Govier, which provided no
protection for those autonomous bargains already entered into would violate
the principle of autonomy. This is ironic, as the result in Govier is mostly
buttressed by policy arguments usually seen in the context of proponents of
at-will; in fact, the case runs counter to the guiding principle of autonomous
dealing.

220

Epstein, In Defense of Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L.R. 947. For an example of a
prominent proponent of the autonomy principle in contract law see, Charles Fried,
Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981).
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5.4.3. The argument from cross-fertilization
Proponents of the at-will presumption in termination should also be
comforted by the approach of the English courts to the implied term of
mutual trust and confidence. The House of Lords in Eastwood v. Magnox

221

has

very recently held that this does not, in any way constrain the manner of
dismissal of an employee. This is the exclusive domain of the statutory action
for unfair dismissal.

Although the House of Lords, partly relied on an

argument that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the provisions of the
Industrial Relations Act 1971 (now contained within the Employment Rights
Act 1996, Part X) preclude any common law development in this area,222 the
decision is founded on the rationale that dismissal is fundamentally different
to the continuation of employment. Parliament has only “occupied the field”
with regard to unfair dismissal.

223

To frame the debate in Eastwood it is necessary to provide a little
background. The year before, in Johnson v. Unisys224 the House of Lords had
closed the door on the development of an action for damages for
psychological harm due to the manner of dismissal under the implied term of
mutual trust and confidence. They rejected the broad proposition that the
implied term of mutual trust and confidence implied a term “that the
221

[2004] 1 W.L.R. 322 [hereinafter Eastwood]
per Lord Nicholls at para [14]. This is a similar manner to the judgment of Justice
in Rehnquist in the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council Inc 435 U.S. 519 (1978), holding that the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 precluded any supplementary
development of the common law. This method of argument has been strongly
criticized for example by Lord Steyn in Eastwood at para[44]; Collins, Claim for
Unfair Dismissal [2003] I.L.J. 305, Lizzie Barmes, The Continuing Conceptual Crisis in
the Common Law of the Contract of Employment, (2004) 67 (3) M.L.R. 435.
223
Eastwood supra note 221 at para 14 per Lord Nicholls
224
[2003] 1 AC 518
222
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employer must treat his employees fairly.” This was because the implied term
225

of mutual trust and confidence did not extend to the conduct of termination.

This introduced a distinction into the law of employment contracts that called
into question how termination was to be differentiated from issued
concerning termination. Given that the quantum of damages which could be
claimed under statute and under the common law term of mutual trust and
confidence was potentially huge, the stakes for identifying a clear distinction
were high.226
Although the facts of Eastwood and McCabe were difficult, Lord Nicholls
held that “identifying the boundary of the ‘Johnson exclusion area’ as it has
been called, is comparatively straightforward.”227 Although a seemingly
continuous course of conduct from disciplinary process to dismissal “may
have to be chopped artificially into separate pieces”228 the separation is held to
nevertheless exist. Although it is clear that the distinction drawn in Johnson is
not particularly popular, many of the concerns relate to the low cap on
damages for unfair dismissal.229
Lord Hoffmann in Johnson had primarily argued that the term of
mutual trust and confidence “in the way it has always been formulated, is
concerned with preserving the continuing relationship which should subsist
between employer and employee. So it does not seem altogether appropriate
225

Eastwood supra note 221 at para 14 per Lord Nicholls
There is a “statutory cap” on the amount of damages which can be claimed under
the statutory cause of action of unfair dismissal (currently £55,000). However,
actions under the implied term of mutual trust and confidence can run much higher.
227
Eastwood, supra note 221, para. 27.
228
Eastwood, supra note 221, para 31.
229
Cf Lizzie Barmes, The Continuing Conceptual Crisis in the Common Law of the
Contract of Employment, (2004) 67 (3) M.L.R. 435.
226
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for use in connection with the way that relationship is terminated.”230 He
considered that, although it would be possible to imply a separate obligation
to exercise the power of dismissal in good faith this was a different question,
resting on different principles.

231

Even Lord Steyn, in his dissent in Johnson, draws a distinction between
hortatory principles, which can exist in conflict, and rules in application,
which cannot. For example, when responding to an argument by counsel for
the employers that recognition of the extension of the implied term of mutual
trust and confidence would conflict with the express term providing that
dismissal may be made on 4 weeks notice,232 he was unsympathetic, claiming
that “they can live together.”
Therefore, the necessity of destroying the at-will presumption, were
good faith performance to be recognized, is far from a fait accomplis. There are
considerations of both policy and principle for keeping them analytically
distinct.
This discussion reaffirms the importance of recognizing the perpetual
nature of Atiyah’s inherent common law tension between hortatory principles
and rule application. It also, however, reaffirms the importance of the courts
being aware that this tension is always in play. Only when this is recognized
can factual patterns be distinguished from each other in a principled manner.

230

Johnson, supra note 224, at para 46, per Lord Hoffmann
Johnson, id., at para 4, citing the judgment of Iacobucci J in Wallace v. United
Grain Growers Ltd 152 D.L.R. 4th 1.
232
Id., At para. 24
231
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6. Conclusions
It is now time to pull together all of the threads in this “comparative
conversation” while avoiding falling into Candide-esque peril.

The

proposition at the heart of this paper was that good faith is more useful in the
employment context in both the US and the UK than is currently recognized,
particularly in the specific example of handbook variation. This seemingly
simple proposition, however potentially ran into perils from many angles.
Nevertheless, the paper has shown a plausible route through these.
In finding a useful route for good faith doctrinally courts are able to
sidestep the vast abstract controversy over “what good faith means” by
viewing it as a doctrinal tool, capable of permitting the courts to legitimate
expectations of the contracting parties. Expectations are legitimated if they
are within the reasonable band of interpretations and expectations, but not if
they come outside this and are likely to destroy the relationship of mutual
trust and confidence. This formulation of good faith is captured in Scalia J’s
judgment in Tymshare, where he holds that the implied covenant of good faith
provides that “reasonable expectations” of the parties are protected.

233

If the

doctrine of good faith is seen to work ex post as a legitimator of expectations
arising out of the employment relationship, this eliminates the necessity to
form a definite view in the Summers/ Burton debate as to whether good faith
is an excluder or whether it protects legitimate expectations.

233

Tymshare, supra note 142, at 1152
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This view of good faith also has important practical implications for
courts on both sides of the Atlantic. It is necessary to set the minds of the
courts free from any temptation of treating the entire content of the contract
as if it derives only from the subjective mind states of the individual parties.
As mentioned in the first section, a complete contract ex ante is at most
234

“vanishingly rare.”

As subjective intent is unknowable, any content given to

good faith will be that of “imputed intent” rather than actual hopes or
expectations of the parties. “Conversational interpretation,”235 in the sense of
interpreting words to divining true subjective “meaning” of the parties, is
impossible in both the interpretation of contracts and statutory interpretation,
as the text is settled at the time of formation.
This aspect of good faith explains why the English implied term of
mutual trust and confidence seems initially to fail the emphatically laissez faire
imbued tests for the implication of terms into contracts.

The courts, in

developing the implied term of mutual trust and confidence have recognized
that, as mentioned in the first section, both parties have a particularly strong
interest in leaving the express terms incomplete in order to permit the
employment relationship to evolve to changing circumstances. This situation
naturally leads to the increased visibility of legal background norms. The
invocation of “mutual trust and confidence” both conceptualizes the
relationship as mutual, but also polices the edges of this relationship to
exclude bad faith.

234
235

supra fn 8.

Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1986) Ch2.
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Viewing the operation of the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence as an incidence of good faith also explains why in Mallone the
courts could use the implied term of mutual trust and confidence as a
principle to delimit an express discretion granted to the employer. Under
formalist contractual orthodoxy, this strong hortatory effect should not have
been possible. In fact, a large amount of the success of the implied term of
mutual trust and confidence can be traced to its hortatory effect, in that it
appeals to the principle of good faith as a higher justification. Many of the
problems English lawyers seem to see with importing such a general concept
of good faith can be allayed to large extent by much of the US literature. Karl
Llewellyn’s tool of situation sensitive reasoning is particularly helpful here.
On this side of the Atlantic the English experience of, what we have
now concluded is an instance of good faith, can be used to explain why and
how the courts can justify regulating handbook variations in the US. When
good faith is recognized as influencing the doctrinal framework it is possible
to build a strong case for the implication of a term at law which constrains the
employer’s ability to vary immediately unilaterally without notice. As in
United Bank v Akhtar,

236

the implied obligation not to read the mobility clause

in the contract so as to allow it to deprive the employee substantially of the
benefits of the rest of the contract; in the situation of handbook variation good
faith can also provide the justifying rationale for implying a term into the
contract limiting the manner in which the employer may vary a handbook
provision.

236

Supra note 95.
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The potential problem posed by any conflict between the hortatory
function of good faith and the at-will presumption were faced head on in the
fifth section of this article. In order to combat this objection it was necessary
to consider the nature of principles and policies directly and their function
within the jurisprudence of the courts. This is not in itself problematic if the
court’s role is seen as one in itself in tension, between the need to decide the
individual case and the need to ensure coherence in the law; and yet it is
recognized that it is the courts continuing duty to make its way through this
treacherously difficult territory with the aid of doctrinal constructs, such as
the various doctrines of contract law, in order to demarcate the permissible
from the impermissible.
One of the most powerful tools at the courts command, which is of
particular importance when dealing with such a seemingly abstract doctrine
as good faith, is that of situation sense. This forces us to see that it is necessary
to look at disputes from both the more abstract side, and than from that of the
individual dispute. By doing so, both a greater understanding and coherence
can be achieved.

This is not to deny the inherent tensions between the

specificity of the implied term and the breadth of the principle if stated as a
rule. However instead, it is to recognize that, as the hortatory function of the
common law and the individual rule application function are always pulling
in different directions, it is useful to look at these tensions from both sides of
the lens. Atiyah’s analysis recognizes that the one cannot live without the
other. At the moment, in general, the US courts tend to be more content at the
hortatory end of the spectrum than the English courts; although in the case of

92

handbook variation some of the US opinions lapse into more formal hidden
implicit theorizing than some of the English cases.

237

However, if neither

dimension is ignored we can therefore ensure that questions are considered
both from the abstract, coherence seeking analysis at the level of principle,
and at the level of individual situation. This brings us back to the very
essence of the situation sense method. Without an appreciation of the
principles behind a distinction between type facts, no rule classification can
appropriately be made. Situation sense, read, in this way, is a methodology
for linking the justifications for the rules whilst being attentive to the factual
patterns to avoid over and underbreadth of them in application.
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For example contrast the reasoning og Jones VCJ in Asmus supra note 48, with
Browne Wilkinson V.C. in Imperial Tobacco, supra note 121.
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